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I 
OREGON’S NEW CODIFICATION 
n January 1, 2010, Oregon’s new choice-of-law codification for 
tort conflicts went into effect.1  This pioneering statute is one 
more example of Oregon’s well-established propensity and capacity 
to innovate and to lead.2  The new statute is the first attempt to codify 
this interesting but difficult subject in a common-law state in the 
United States.3  This Article provides a section-by-section exegesis4 
of the new statute in an effort to assist courts and counsel in 
interpreting and applying it.5 
 
1 See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 31.850–.890 (2009).  This statute is reproduced in an 
Appendix, infra, and is hereinafter referred to as “the Act” or “the statute.”  All citations to 
sections and subsections without further designation are citations to this statute. According 
to its terms, the Act applies to actions filed after its effective date of January 1, 2010, even 
if the underlying claim arose before that date.  See 2009 Or. Laws 451 § 13 (S.B. 561). 
2 See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Product Design Liability in 
Oregon and the New Restatement, 78 OR. L. REV. 1, 2 (1999) (“Oregon courts have been 
leaders in product liability. . . . Oregon decisions have traditionally found their way into 
the leading torts and products liability casebooks as classic works that deserve the 
attention of scholars and students of the law. . . . More importantly, they are cited and 
relied upon with great frequency by courts throughout the country. . . . [A]s co-reporters 
for the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability[,] . . . the authors turned to the 
Oregon decisions for guidance in drafting both the black letter rules and the official 
comments.” (footnotes omitted)). 
3 The only other state to enact a comprehensive choice-of-law codification is the civil 
law or “mixed jurisdiction” state of Louisiana, which has had a rich tradition of 
codification.  The Louisiana conflicts codification, also drafted by this author, was enacted 
into law by Act 923 of 1991, became effective January 1, 1992, and now forms Book IV 
of the Louisiana Civil Code. It is discussed, inter alia, in Symeon C. Symeonides, The 
Conflicts Book of the Louisiana Civil Code: Civilian, American, or Original?, 83 TUL. L. 
REV. 1041 (2009).  For a discussion of the tort provisions of that codification, see Symeon 
C. Symeonides, Louisiana’s New Law of Choice of Law for Tort Conflicts: An Exegesis, 
66 TUL. L. REV. 677 (1992) [hereinafter Symeonides, Louisiana’s New Law].  Another 
similar codification drafted by this author for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is still 
pending before the Puerto Rico legislature as Book VII of the proposed new Puerto Rico 
Civil Code.  See Draft Code of Private International Law for the Commonwealth of Puerto 
Rico, available at http://www.codigocivilpr.net/; Symeon C. Symeonides, Revising Puerto 
Rico’s Conflicts Law: A Preview, 28 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 413 (1990) [hereinafter 
Symeonides, Revising Puerto Rico’s Conflicts Law].  The statute discussed in this Article 
draws heavily from both of the above codifications but also differs in important respects 
(besides its common law style of drafting). 
4 The word is Greek and it means the exposition, objective explanation, or “drawing 
out” of the meaning of a given text. 
5 The author has drafted the new law in his capacity as Reporter for the Oregon Law 
Commission and presented it to the Oregon Legislature.  He was assisted by another 
Reporter, Professor James A.R. Nafziger of Willamette University, and a ten-member 
O
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A.  Background: The Traditional Choice-of-Law System and the 
Choice-of-Law Revolution 
For more than one hundred years, Oregon courts—along with all 
other American courts—followed a rigid territorialist-rule system for 
determining the law governing cases that had contacts with more than 
one state (conflicts cases).  In tort and contract conflicts, this system 
mandated the application of the law of the state in which the injury 
occurred (lex loci delicti) and the law of the place in which the 
contract was made (lex loci contractus), respectively, regardless of 
any other contacts or factors.6 
Over time, this system proved completely inadequate to rationally 
resolve the more frequent and complex conflicts brought about by 
increased cross-border activity and mobility of people.  Courts 
gradually began searching for oblique ways to avoid the often 
arbitrary and artificial results the traditional system dictated.  By the 
1960s, judicial dissension against that system acquired the dimensions 
and intensity of an open “revolution” as many courts began 
abandoning the lex loci delicti and lex loci contractus rules in favor of 
flexible, open-ended “approaches.”7 
Oregon was among the leaders of this new movement.  In 1964, the 
Oregon Supreme Court became the second state supreme court in the 
United States to join the revolution.8  In Lilienthal v. Kaufman,9 the 
court abandoned the traditional choice-of-law rule of lex loci 
contractus and replaced it with an approach known as governmental 
interest analysis, which was first advocated by Professor Brainerd 
 
Work Group, with the members listed infra at notes 44–49 and accompanying text.  The 
opinions expressed in this Article are solely those of the author. 
6 For a discussion of the traditional choice-of-law system, see EUGENE F. SCOLES, 
PETER HAY, PATRICK J. BORCHERS & SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, CONFLICT OF LAWS 18–
25 (4th ed. 2004); see also Symeon C. Symeonides, The First Conflicts Restatement 
Through the Eyes of Old: As Bad as Its Reputation?, 32 S. ILL. U. L.J. 39 (2007). 
7 For documentation and discussion of this movement, see SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, 
THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE (2006) 
[hereinafter SYMEONIDES, REVOLUTION]. 
8 The case that started the revolution is Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 
1963), a case involving a tort conflict decided by the New York Court of Appeals on May 
9, 1963. 
9 239 Or. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964).  Lilienthal was decided on Sept. 30, 1964.  Two 
weeks after Lilienthal, Pennsylvania became the third state to join the revolution in 
Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 203 A.2d 796 (Pa. 1964), a case involving a tort conflict 
decided on October 14, 1964. 
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Currie.10  Although two earlier cases in other states had also 
abandoned the lex loci contractus rule, their reasoning was hesitant 
and equivocal.11  Lilienthal was the first truly revolutionary case in 
contract conflicts.12  Three years later, in Casey v. Manson 
Construction & Engineering Co., Oregon completed the abandonment 
of the traditional system by discarding the lex loci delicti rule for tort 
conflicts as well.13  The court relied instead on the Restatement 
(Second) of Conflict of Laws, which was then in draft form.14 
In the rest of the United States, the choice-of-law revolution first 
caught fire in the 1970s, then spread in the 1980s, and finally declared 
victory in the 1990s, leading to the demolition of the centuries-old 
choice-of-law system (at least in tort and contract conflicts).  By 
2009, forty-two U.S. jurisdictions had abandoned the traditional 
system in tort conflicts and forty-one jurisdictions had done so in 
contract conflicts.15 
Although the revolution changed American conflicts law in many 
beneficial ways, it did not produce a new choice-of-law system to 
replace the old one.  Rather than offering a unified vision for the 
future, the revolution offered conflicting theories, which the courts 
have merged together, often adding their own variations.16  In its zeal 
 
10 See generally BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 
(1963).  For a discussion of this approach, as well as its judicial following today, see 
SYMEONIDES, REVOLUTION, supra note 7, at 13–24, 71–82. 
11 See W.H. Barber Co. v. Hughes, 63 N.E.2d 417 (Ind. 1945); Auten v. Auten, 124 
N.E.2d 99 (N.Y. 1954).  These two cases, as well as a Puerto Rico case, Md. Cas. Co. v. 
San Juan Racing Ass’n, 83 P.R. 559 (1961), adopted the “center of gravity” approach, 
which is generally considered the transitional point between the traditional system and 
modern approaches. 
12 Lilienthal was methodologically revolutionary in the sense that it opened new ways 
of thinking about conflict of laws. This does not mean that Lilienthal was correctly 
decided. For this reason, Lilienthal was overruled by ORS 81.112 (effective in 2002).  See 
Symeon C. Symeonides, Oregon’s Choice-of-Law Codification for Contract Conflicts: An 
Exegesis, 44 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 205, 219–21 (2007) [hereinafter Symeonides, 
Oregon’s Choice-of-Law Codification for Contract Conflicts]. 
13 247 Or. 274, 276–77, 428 P.2d 898, 899 (1967); see also infra text accompanying 
notes 200–01. 
14 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971). 
15 See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2009: Twenty-
Third Annual Survey, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 227, 231–32 (2010); see also SYMEONIDES, 
REVOLUTION, supra note 7, at 38–50. 
16 Cf. Friedrich K. Juenger, A Third Conflicts Restatement?, 75 IND. L.J. 403, 403 
(2000) (“[O]ne finds authors who are at doctrinal loggerheads peacefully united in a single 
footnote; . . . one encounters prose so turgid and stilted that one suspects the judge (or 
more likely the law clerk who actually drafted the opinion) never really grasped the idea 
behind the particular conflicts approach the court purports to follow.” (footnote omitted)). 
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to cleanse the system from all the vestiges of traditional thinking, the 
revolution careened to the other extreme of denouncing not only the 
particular rules of the first Restatement of Conflict of Laws,17 but also 
all choice-of-law rules in general.18  Rules were replaced with 
“approaches” namely flexible formulae that do not prescribe solutions 
in advance, but simply enumerate the factors to be considered in the 
judicial fashioning of an ad hoc solution for each conflict.  Although 
these factors differ from one approach to the next, all such approaches 
are open-ended and call for an individualized, ad hoc handling of each 
case.  The result was that, in relatively short time, American conflicts 
law began looking like “a tale of a thousand-and-one-cases.”19  “Each 
case [was] decided as if it were unique and of first impression.”20  
Just as the traditional system had gone too far toward certainty to the 
exclusion of flexibility, the revolution went too far in embracing 
flexibility to the exclusion of certainty. 
Oregon did not avoid this loss of certainty.  In reviewing Oregon 
choice-of-law cases after Lilienthal and Casey, an experienced, long-
time observer of the Oregon conflicts scene characterized them as 
“puzzling,” “extraordinarily undisciplined,” and “bewildering.”21  He 
noted that one version of Oregon’s reliance on the Restatement 
(Second) engaged in weighing the “interests” of the involved states 
while minimizing other factors.  Another version employed “an 
arithmetic of contacts—a gravity-of-contacts approach—that 
minimizes competing interests,” while a third version “sticks within 
the bark of territorialism to define the most significant contact or 
contacts without recourse to governmental interests, policies or other 
considerations.”  Taken together, the three versions presented a 
“bewildering picture.”22 
Indeed, bewilderment is a common sentiment among lawyers 
contemplating—or seeking to avoid—litigation of choice-of-law 
 
17 See generally RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934). 
18 See CURRIE, supra note 10, at 180 (“The [traditional] rules . . . have not worked and 
cannot be made to work. . . . But the root of the trouble goes deeper.  In attempting to use the 
rules we encounter difficulties that stem not from the fact that the particular rules are bad,  
. . . but rather from the fact that we have such rules at all.”); see also id. at 183 (“We 
would be better off without choice-of-law rules.”). 
19 P. John Kozyris, Interest Analysis Facing Its Critics—And, Incidentally, What Should 
Be Done About Choice of Law for Products Liability, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 569, 578 (1985). 
20 Id. at 580. 
21 James A.R. Nafziger, Oregon’s Project to Codify Conflicts Law Applicable to Torts, 
12 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 287, 293, 295, 304 (2004). 
22 Id. at 294–95. 
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issues in the United States today.  The excessive fluidity of the 
various judicial choice-of-law approaches often makes it very 
difficult, if not impossible, to predict the outcome of a choice-of-law 
decision.  While flexibility is preferable to uncritical rigidity, too 
much flexibility can be as problematic as no flexibility at all.23  
Besides increasing litigation costs24 and wasting judicial resources,25 
too much flexibility often leads to judicial subjectivism and dissimilar 
handling of similar cases, which tests the citizens’ faith in the legal 
system and tends to undermine its very legitimacy.26 
Gradually, the initial euphoria surrounding the revolution subsided 
and was replaced with disillusionment.  Judges—particularly federal 
judges, who often adjudicate complex multidistrict cases—have 
routinely advocated the enactment of federal choice-of-law legislation 
for such cases.27  At least one judge has described modern American 
conflicts law as “a veritable jungle, [in] which, if the law can be 
 
23 See Kozyris, supra note 19, at 580 (“[A]ny system calling for open-ended and endless 
soul-searching on a case-by-case basis carries a high burden of persuasion.”); Maurice 
Rosenberg, Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 UCLA L. REV. 641, 644 (1968) (“The idea 
that judges can be turned loose in the three-dimensional chess games we have made of 
[conflicts] cases, and can be told to do hand-tailored justice, case by case, free from the 
constraints or guidelines of rules, is a vain and dangerous illusion.”). 
24 See Patrick J. Borchers, Empiricism and Theory in Conflicts Law, 75 IND. L.J. 509, 
509 (2000) (“[T]he extreme flexibility of the modern approaches probably brings 
increased litigation costs, in particular through the need to prosecute appeals. . . . [T]he 
ever-present wild card of choice of law may discourage settlement.”). 
25 See P. John Kozyris, The Conflicts Provisions of the ALI’s Complex Litigation 
Project: A Glass Half Full?, 54 LA. L. REV. 953, 956 (1994) (“Conflicts theorists . . . have 
been notoriously indifferent to the issue of efficiency, treating every case as a unique 
specimen calling for custom-made handling on the tacit assumption that litigational 
resources are infinite.”); see also Kaczmarek v. Allied Chem. Corp., 836 F.2d 1055, 1057 
(7th Cir. 1987); Patrick J. Borchers, Back to the Past: Anti-Pragmatism in American 
Conflicts Law, 48 MERCER L. REV. 721, 724 (1997); Erin A. O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, 
From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1151 (2000); Shirley A. 
Wiegand, Fifty Conflict of Laws “Restatements”: Merging Judicial Discretion and 
Legislative Endorsement, 65 LA. L. REV. 1 (2004). 
26 See Phaedon John Kozyris, Conflicts Theory for Dummies: Après le Deluge, Where 
Are We on Producers Liability?, 60 LA. L. REV. 1161, 1162 (2000) (“[T]elling the courts 
in each conflicts case to make a choice and fashion the applicable law ‘ad hoc’ and ‘anew’ 
. . . as is often done under the prevailing conflicts theories, appears to me not only 
inconsistent with the basic principles of the separation of powers, not only burdensome 
and potentially arbitrary beyond reason, not only disorienting to the transacting persons, 
but essentially empty of meaning. . . . [U]npredictable law is not law to begin with.”). 
27 See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int’l Airport, Denver, Colo., on Nov. 
15, 1987, 720 F. Supp. 1445, 1454–55 (D. Colo. 1988); Jack B. Weinstein, Mass Tort 
Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in a Multinational World Communicating by 
Extraterrestrial Satellites, 37 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 145, 153 (2001) (“A federal statute 
would help.  An international treaty would be even better.”). 
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found out, leads not to a ‘rule of action’ but a reign of chaos 
dominated in each case by the judge’s ‘informed guess.’”28  The New 
York Court of Appeals, which led the revolution and is generally 
considered one of the most influential courts in the country, has 
confronted this “chaos” by enunciating, in a quasi-legislative fashion, 
a set of rules (the Neumeier rules) for resolving certain tort 
conflicts.29  Even as the revolution reached its peak, some of the 
revolution’s scholastic protagonists recognized the need for a new set 
of rules.30  For example, as early as 1965, Professor David Cavers 
became disillusioned with the uncertainty unleashed by the revolution 
and recognized the need to “provide rules . . . under which the same 
cases will be decided the same way no matter where the suit is 
brought.”31  He also showed the way by proposing his own 
“principles of preference” for tort and contract conflicts.32  Professor 
Willis Reese, the chief drafter of the second Restatement, also 
proclaimed that “the formulation of rules should be as much an 
objective in choice of law as it is in other areas of law.”33  Other 
scholars have also advocated the development of rules,34 and some 
have proposed rules of their own.35  In 1994, the American Law 
 
28 In re Paris Air Crash of Mar. 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732, 739 (C.D. Cal. 1975). 
29 See Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454, 457–58 (N.Y. 1972). 
30 See Courtland H. Peterson, New Openness to Statutory Choice of Law Solutions, 38 
AM. J. COMP. L. 423, 442 (1990). 
31 DAVID F. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS 23 (1965) (“We will not . . . 
fulfill the objectives of the conflict of laws, unless we can provide rules . . . under which 
the same cases will be decided the same way no matter where the suit is brought . . . .”). 
32 See id. at 139–203. 
33 See Willis Reese, General Course on Private International Law, 150 RECUEIL DES 
COURS 1, 61 passim (1976).  As early as 1976, Reese argued that the conflicts experience 
since the revolution had “reached the stage where most areas of choice of law can be 
covered by general principles which are subject to imprecise exceptions.  We should press 
on, however, beyond these principles to the development, as soon as our knowledge 
permits, of precise rules.”  Id. at 62. 
34 See, e.g., SCOLES, HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 6, at 105–10; 
Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Case for Federal Choice of Law 
Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1 (1991); Alfred Hill, For a Third Conflicts Restatement—But Stop 
Trying to Reinvent the Wheel, 75 IND. L.J. 535 (2000); Larry Kramer, On the Need for a 
Uniform Choice of Law Code, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2134 (1991); Maurice Rosenberg, Two 
Views on Kell v. Henderson: An Opinion for the New York Court of Appeals, 67 COLUM. 
L. REV. 459 (1967); Ralph U. Whitten, Curing the Deficiencies of the Conflicts 
Revolution: A Proposal for National Legislation on Choice of Law, Jurisdiction, and 
Judgments, 37 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 259 (2001); Wiegand, supra note 25. 
35 See, e.g., SCOLES, HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 6, at 937–39 
(discussing products liability rules proposed by Cavers, Weintraub, Juenger, and Kozyris); 
SYMEONIDES, REVOLUTION, supra note 7, at 207–10, 233–36, 259–63, 346; Robert A. 
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Institute proposed a comprehensive set of choice-of-law rules for 
mass torts and mass contracts cases for enactment by the U.S. 
Congress,36 and in 1999, American conflicts professors devoted their 
annual meeting to discussing the need for a third Conflicts 
Restatement,37 thus commencing a debate that continues today.38  
Although the debates regarding a new Restatement and the need for 
rules remain inconclusive, the nationwide consensus—even among 
academics—is to no longer take Currie’s aphorism that “[we] [are] 
better off without choice-of-law rules”39 at face value.40  The 
pendulum has begun swinging back.  Nonetheless, these pleas for a 
new set of rules have been followed by legislative action in only two 
states: Louisiana41 and (recently) Oregon. 
B.  Oregon Takes the Lead, Once Again 
Once again, Oregon took the lead in recognizing the need for a new 
way, an exit strategy from the anarchy of the conflicts revolution.  
This strategy called for a new breed of smart, evolutionary choice-of-
law rules that would preserve the methodological accomplishments of 
the revolution while restoring a proper equilibrium between certainty 
and flexibility.  To implement this strategy, the Oregon Law 
 
Sedler, Choice of Law in Conflicts Torts Cases: A Third Restatement or Rules of Choice of 
Law?, 75 IND. L.J. 615, 619–22 (2000); Wiegand, supra note 25. 
36 See AM. LAW INST., COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
ANALYSIS (1994). 
37 See Symposium, Preparing for the Next Century—A New Restatement of Conflicts?, 
75 IND. L.J. 399 (2000) (containing an introduction by Shreve; articles by Juenger, 
Richman and Reynolds, Symeonides, and Weinberg; and commentaries by Borchers, 
Dane, Gottesman, Hill, Maier, Peterson, Posnak, Reimann, Reppy, Jr., Sedler, Silberman 
and Lowenfeld, Simson, Singer, Twerski, and Weintraub).  This debate was initiated by 
this author in a previous annual meeting, which celebrated the silver anniversary of the 
Restatement (Second).  See Symeon C. Symeonides, The Judicial Acceptance of the 
Second Conflicts Restatement: A Mixed Blessing, 56 MD. L. REV. 1248 (1997). 
38 See Symposium, American Conflicts Law at the Dawn of the 21st Century, 37 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1 (2001) (containing articles by Symeonides, Juenger, Kay, von 
Mehren, Weinstein, and Weintraub and commentaries by Cox, Nafziger, Sedler, Shreve, 
and Whitten); Symeon C. Symeonides, A New Conflicts Restatement: Why Not?, 5 J. 
PRIVATE INT’L L. 383 (2009). 
39 CURRIE, supra note 10, at 183. 
40 See Peterson, supra note 30, at 423 (“[W]e may be seeing a sea change in the 
attitudes of American conflicts scholars with respect to the use of statutes in solving 
conflicts problems.”). 
41 See discussion supra note 3. 
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Commission42 undertook the ambitious project of drafting choice-of-
law rules for enactment by the Oregon State Legislature. 
The first phase of this project produced a new comprehensive 
statute for contract conflicts.  This statute, codified as Oregon Revised 
Statutes (ORS) 81.100 to 81.135, was first drafted by the Commission 
in 2000, and was then unanimously adopted by both houses of the 
Oregon Legislature in 2001, and becoming effective on January 1, 
2002.43 
The Act discussed in this Article represents the second phase of 
this project.  The Act restores predictability in Oregon’s conflicts law 
by providing specific rules for determining which state’s law will 
govern most tort and other noncontractual claims arising from 
situations involving contacts with more than one state.  However, as 
explained below, the Act also provides a certain degree of flexibility, 
thus avoiding the shortcomings of the traditional system and the 
rigidity that caused the revolution.  This new equilibrium between the 
need for legal certainty and the need for a certain degree of flexibility 
should serve Oregon well for several generations and could well be a 
model for other states to follow. 
The Act has been drafted under the auspices of the Oregon Law 
Commission by the author as Reporter, assisted by another Reporter, 
Professor James A.R. Nafziger.44  Twelve successive drafts were 
submitted to and debated by a Work Group chaired by this author and 
consisting of one retired supreme court justice,45 one court of appeals 
judge,46 one trial court judge,47 five practicing attorneys,48 and two 
 
42 Established by statute, the Oregon Law Commission is Oregon’s official law reform 
agency.  It is headquartered at Willamette University College of Law under an agreement 
with the State of Oregon and is directed by a member of the Willamette faculty, Professor 
Jeff Dobbins.  For the history of the Commission and its work in the last ten years, see 
David R. Kenagy, The Oregon Law Commission at Ten: Finding Vision for the Future in 
the Functions of the Past, 44 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 169 (2007).  Kenagy was the 
Commission’s first executive director. 
43 For a discussion of this statute, see James A.R. Nafziger, Oregon’s Conflicts Law 
Applicable to Contracts, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 397 (2002); Symeonides, Oregon’s 
Choice-of-Law Codification for Contract Conflicts, supra note 12.  Professor Nafziger 
served as Reporter for that project. 
44 Thomas B. Stoel Professor of Law, Willamette University College of Law. 
45 The Honorable Hans Linde, retired justice of the Oregon Supreme Court and 
Distinguished Jurist in Residence at Willamette University College of Law. 
46 The Honorable Jack L. Landau of the Oregon Court of Appeals. 
47 The Honorable Janice Wilson of the Oregon Circuit Court, 4th Judicial District, 
Multnomah County. 
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law professors.49  The drafts drew on the vast experience of American 
courts in deciding tort conflicts in the four decades since the choice-
of-law revolution began, as well as the experience of other 
jurisdictions in drafting rules for tort conflicts.50  After approval by 
the Work Group and then the Oregon Law Commission, the final 
draft was submitted to the Legislature and introduced as Senate Bill 
561.  The Bill was unanimously approved by the Senate on March 26, 
2009, unanimously approved by the House on May 29, 2009, and 
signed into law by Governor Ted Kulongoski on June 23, 2009. 
Each section of the Act is accompanied by extensive explanatory 
comments, which have been written by the author and approved by 
the Oregon Law Commission.51  These official comments 
accompanied the bill when introduced to the Legislature and they thus 
remain de facto an important part of legislative history.52 
 
48 The five attorneys are: Kathryn H. Clarke; Jonathan M. Hoffman (Martin, Bischoff, 
Templeton, Langslet & Hoffman LLP); Linda C. Love (Williams, Love, O’Leary & 
Powers, PC); James N. Westwood (Stoel Rives LLP); and Leonard Williamson (Oregon 
Department of Justice, Trial Division). 
49 The two professors are Maurice Holland and Dominick Vetri, both of the University 
of Oregon School of Law.  The Work Group was also assisted by Wendy Johnson, Deputy 
Executive Director and General Counsel of the Oregon Law Commission, and by Kristy 
Nelson, staff attorney at the Oregon Law Commission. 
50 A Sourcebook containing rules from other jurisdictions was compiled by this author 
and made available to the Work Group.  See Oregon Law Commission Work Group on 
Choice-of-Law for Torts, Choice-of-Law Rules for Torts from Other Jurisdictions: A 
Source-Book (July 28, 2008) (on file with author).  The Sourcebook contains rules from: 
the codifications of Louisiana, Puerto Rico, and eighteen foreign countries; five 
international conventions; the Restatement (Second); the ALI’s Complex Litigation 
Project; the Neumeier rules; and rules proposed by eight academic authors. 
51 Because the author of these comments and this Article is the same, the Article draws 
heavily from the comments without using quotation marks. 
52 See generally State v. Serrano, 346 Or. 311, 210 P.3d 892 (2009); State v. White, 346 
Or. 275, 211 P.3d 248 (2009); State v. Gaines, 346 Or. 160, 206 P.3d 1042 (2009); 
Filipetti v. Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife, 224 Or. App. 122, 197 P.3d 535 (2008); State v. 
Spears, 223 Or. App. 675, 196 P.3d 1037 (2008); State v. Merida-Medina, 221 Or. App. 
614, 191 P.3d 708 (2008), rev. denied, 345 Or. 690 (2009).  ORS 31.890 provides that the 
Oregon Law Commission “shall make available on the website maintained by the 
commission a copy of the commentary approved by the commission for the provisions of 
ORS 31.850 to 31.890.” OR. REV. STAT. § 21.890 (2009).  The commentary is posted at 
http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/olc/groups/2007-2009/pdf/conflicts.sb561.report.2009 
.pdf. 
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II 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE NEW ACT 
The Act consists of fourteen sections, which may be grouped into 
three parts.  The first part, consisting of ORS 31.850 through 31.865, 
deals with preliminary issues, including definitions of terms used in 
the Act, a delineation of the Act’s substantive and geographical scope, 
and special rules for characterization, localization, and determining 
domicile. 
The second part of the Act, consisting of ORS 31.870 and 31.872, 
provides for certain noncontractual claims that will be governed by 
Oregon law without further inquiry.  ORS 31.870 lists seven 
categories of such claims, beginning with actions in which (a) the 
parties agree to the application of the law of Oregon, (b) none of the 
parties raises the issue of applicability of foreign law, or (c) the party 
relying on foreign law fails to assist the court in establishing that 
law’s content after being requested by the court to do so.  ORS 31.872 
deals with products liability actions and provides that Oregon law 
governs actions in which Oregon has certain specified contacts with 
the parties or the dispute. 
The third part of the Act consists of ORS 31.875 through 31.885.  
ORS 31.885 provides that if, after the parties had knowledge of the 
events giving rise to the dispute, the parties agree to the application of 
the law of a state other than Oregon, then the agreement is 
enforceable—so long as it meets certain specified requirements.  In 
the absence of such an agreement, the applicable law is determined 
under ORS 31.875, 31.878, or 31.880.  ORS 31.875 applies when 
determining the applicable law in claims between the injured person 
and the person whose conduct caused the injury.  ORS 31.880 applies 
to claims between or among third parties.  ORS 31.878 is the Act’s 
general and residual approach, which applies when not displaced by 
another section of the Act. 
Through this structure, the Act provides an easy-to-follow road 
map that will significantly simplify the courts’ task in resolving 
conflicts of law in torts and other cases involving noncontractual 
claims.  A court or other decision maker encountering such a case 
may use the following checklist: 
(1) If, after the events giving rise to the dispute, the parties agreed 
to the application of Oregon law, or if none of the parties raises the 
issue of applicability of foreign law, or the party who relies on 
foreign law fails to assist the court in establishing that law’s 
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content after being requested by the court to do so, Oregon law 
applies without a choice-of-law analysis.53 
(2) If the action is one of those listed in ORS 31.870(4)-(7), 
Oregon law applies without any further inquiry and without any 
exceptions. 
(3) If the action is a products liability action that fits the 
requirements of ORS 31.872, then Oregon law applies, unless the 
opposing party successfully invokes one of two exceptions stated 
in that provision,54 in which case the applicable law will be 
selected under the general approach of ORS 31.878. 
(4) If the action is not one of those that must be governed by 
Oregon law under ORS 31.870 or 31.872 and the parties agreed to 
the application of non-Oregon law after they had knowledge of the 
events giving rise to the dispute, the agreed-upon law applies—so 
long as the agreement meets the requirements of ORS 31.885. 
(5) In the absence of such an agreement, a distinction is made 
between, on the one hand, claims between the injured person and 
the person whose conduct caused the injury, and on the other hand, 
claims between or among third parties. ORS 31.875 provides for 
the former category of claims.  The law designated by ORS 31.875 
applies unless the opposing party successfully invokes at least one 
of the two exceptions contained in that provision,55 in which case 
the applicable law will be selected under the general approach of 
ORS 31.878. 
(6) For claims between or among third parties, such as joint 
tortfeasors, the applicable law is selected under the flexible 
approach of ORS 31.878.56 
(7) ORS 31.878 applies when none of the other sections of this 
Act are applicable or when the other sections expressly refer to 
ORS 31.878. 
 
53 See OR. REV. STAT. § 31.870(1)–(3) (2009). 
54 See § 31.872(2)–(3).  For further discussion, see infra notes 110–14 and 
accompanying text. 
55 See § 31.875(3)(b), (4).  For further discussion, see infra Part V.B.3 and Part VI. 
56 See § 31.880. 
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III 
PRELIMINARIES 
A.  Applicability 
ORS 31.855 delineates the “applicability” of the new Act—that is, 
its substantive and geographical scope.  The substantive scope is 
composed of torts and other “noncontractual” claims.  The quoted 
term, which is explained below, is juxtaposed with “contractual” 
claims, which are covered by the 2002 choice-of-law statute 
previously mentioned.57  Pursuant to ORS 31.855, the geographical 
scope of the Act encompasses all noncontractual claims for which “a 
choice between or among the laws of more than one state is at issue.”  
A choice of law is “at issue” when: (1) the claim arises from events or 
circumstances that have pertinent contacts with more than one state, 
and (2) the laws of the contact states on the disputed issues are in 
material conflict such that each law would produce a different 
outcome. 
ORS 31.855 also establishes the Act’s residual character vis-à-vis 
other Oregon statutes that expressly designate the law applicable to a 
particular noncontractual claim.58  One example of such a statute is 
ORS 12.410 through 12.480, which contains the Uniform Conflict of 
Laws-Limitations Act.  This statute determines which state’s statute 
of limitations applies to conflicts cases litigated in Oregon, regardless 
of whether the case involves a claim based in tort, contract, or another 
area of the law. 
Other substantive Oregon statutes also contain isolated provisions 
delineating the intended reach of those statutes to include or exclude 
certain cases that have non-Oregon contacts.  For example, ORS 
656.126(1) provides that Oregon’s workers’ compensation statutes 
apply to workers employed in Oregon and injured in the course of 
their employment while on temporary assignment in another state.59  
 
57 See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
58 See § 31.855 (stating that the provisions of this Act “do not supersede the provisions 
of other Oregon statutes that expressly designate the law governing a particular 
noncontractual claim”). 
59 OR. REV. STAT. §  656.126(1) (2009).  This section provides in part: 
If a worker employed in this state and subject to this chapter temporarily leaves 
the state incidental to that employment and receives an accidental injury arising 
out of and in the course of employment, the worker . . . is entitled to the benefits 
of this chapter as though the worker were injured within this state. 
Id. 
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Conversely, ORS 656.126(2) excludes from the coverage of Oregon’s 
workers’ compensation statutes certain workers employed in another 
state and injured in Oregon while on temporary assignment in 
Oregon. 
Finally, another example is Oregon’s products liability statute as 
amended in 2009.  One of the amended provisions provides that in 
certain products liability actions involving products manufactured 
outside Oregon, the applicable statute of repose will be the statute of 
the state of manufacture in some cases and Oregon’s statute in other 
cases, depending on certain contingencies.60  All of the foregoing 
provisions are veritable choice-of-law rules, even though the 
provisions do not use such explicit terms.  This Act is not intended to 
displace—and indeed, gives priority to—these and other similar rules 
found in other Oregon statutes.61 
B.  Definitions 
1.  Noncontractual Claim 
ORS 31.850 defines certain terms used in the Act, including the 
term “noncontractual claim,” which delineates the Act’s substantive 
scope.  ORS 31.850(5) provides that the term noncontractual claim 
means “a claim, other than a claim for failure to perform a contractual 
or other consensual obligation, that arises from a tort as defined in 
ORS 30.260[(8)], or any conduct that caused or may cause injury 
compensable by damages, without regard to whether damages are 
sought.”62  ORS 30.260(8), the Oregon Torts Claim Act, defines a tort 
as: 
[T]he breach of a legal duty that is imposed by law, other than a 
duty arising from contract or quasi-contract, the breach of which 
results in injury to a specific person or persons for which the law 
 
60 See § 30.905(2), (4) (as amended by 2009 Or. Laws 485 (S.B. 284)).  In products 
liability actions for personal injury or property damage, the applicable statute of repose 
will be the statute that provides a longer length of time.  In such actions arising from death, 
the applicable statute of repose will be the one that provides for the shorter length of time. 
In all actions, if the product was manufactured in a foreign country, the U.S. state in which 
the product was first imported replaces the state of manufacture.  See id. 
61 See discussion supra note 58. 
62 § 31.850(5).  Under ORS 31.860(1), Oregon law determines whether a particular 
claim qualifies as a noncontractual claim so as to fall within the scope of this statute, even 
if the claim is ultimately governed by the law of another state.  § 31.860(1). 
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provides a civil right of action for damages or for a protective 
remedy.63 
Statistically, most noncontractual claims arise from torts.64  
However, the definition of ORS 31.850(5) encompasses not only tort 
claims but also claims (other than claims for failure to perform a 
contractual or other consensual obligation) that arise from “any 
conduct that caused or may cause an injury compensable by 
damages.”65  Examples of such other claims are claims arising from 
racial discrimination, employment discrimination (beyond claims 
covered by employment law), unfair trade practices, breach of 
fiduciary duty, and restitution. 
2.  Conduct and Injury 
“Conduct” and “injury” are two of the constituent elements of a 
noncontractual claim that are defined in ORS 31.850. 
ORS 31.850(1) defines “conduct” as an act that has occurred or 
that “may” occur so as to include future conduct that may cause future 
injury, such as when one is preparing to undertake activities on 
property that may cause injury to, or on, nearby property.66  The 
conduct may also be an omission, such as when one’s failure to 
exercise due care in the use of property causes injury to another.  Of 
course, in order to qualify as a constituent element of a noncontractual 
claim for the purposes of this Act, the conduct must have caused—or 
have the potential to cause—a compensable injury.  ORS 31.850(5) 
speaks of conduct that caused, or may cause, injury in order to cover 
situations in which a party seeks injunctive or declaratory relief for 
ongoing injurious conduct or to prevent future injurious conduct. 
ORS 31.850(3) defines injury as a physical or nonphysical (e.g., 
economic or emotional) harm to person or property.67  The injury 
may be present or future injury, but in order to qualify as a constituent 
element of a noncontractual claim for the purposes of this Act, the 
injury must be potentially compensable—even if the claimant does 
not seek damages in the particular case. 
 
63 § 30.260(8). 
64 For this reason, much of the discussion in this Article refers to “torts,” “tortfeasors,” 
and “victims” of a tort. 
65 § 31.850(5). 
66 See § 31.850(1).  
67 § 31.850(3). 
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3.  Person and Domicile 
The Act uses the term “person” to include both a natural and a 
legal person.  ORS 31.850(6) defines person through reference to 
ORS 174.100, which provides that “‘[p]erson’ includes individuals, 
corporations, associations, firms, partnerships, limited liability 
companies and joint stock companies.”68 
The Act uses “domicile” as a pertinent contact or connecting factor 
for both natural and legal persons.  Under ORS 31.860(1), the 
question of where a natural person is domiciled is answered under 
standards established by Oregon law (including ORS 31.865 of this 
Act), even if it is ultimately determined that the person is domiciled in 
another state.69 
ORS 31.865(1)(a) defines the domicile of a natural person as the 
simultaneous occurrence of the following two elements: (1) the 
physical element of a person’s actual residence in a given state, and 
(2) the mental element of that person’s intent to make that state his or 
her home state for the time being and for an indefinite period 
thereafter.70  ORS 31.865(1)(b) begins by restating the general 
principle that domicile, once established, continues until it is 
superseded by a new domicile—that is, until both the physical 
element of residing in another state and the mental element of 
intending to make that state the person’s home coincide again.71  The 
second sentence of subsection (1)(b) deals with persons whose intent 
to change their domicile is legally ineffective, for example, because 
they are under legal compulsion (e.g., prisoners or soldiers), or 
because they lack the mental capacity to form the requisite intent 
 
68 OR. REV. STAT. § 174.100(5) (2009). 
69 ORS 31.865(3) provides that, for purposes of this Act, the domicile of a natural or 
legal “person is determined as of the date of the injury for which the noncontractual claim 
is made,” rather than at a later time, such as the time of the filing of the action or the time 
of litigation.  See § 31.865(3).  However, when a person changes domicile to another state 
after the time of the injury, the new domicile may be a “relevant contact” under ORS 
31.878.  See infra Part V.C.2. 
70 § 31.865(1)(a).  For a similar definition, see OR. REV. STAT. § 111.005(14) (2009) 
(defining domicile as “the place of abode of a person, where the person intends to remain 
and to which, if absent, the person intends to return”).  For a general discussion of 
domicile in American conflicts law, see LUTHER L. MCDOUGAL, III ET AL., AMERICAN 
CONFLICTS LAW 17–40 (5th ed. 2001); SCOLES, HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra 
note 6, at 233–83; SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, AMERICAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
88–89 (2008) [hereinafter SYMEONIDES, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW]; RUSSELL J. 
WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 13–51 (5th ed. 2006). 
71 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 19 (1971); SCOLES, HAY, 
BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 6, at 251–52. 
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regarding domicile (e.g., minors or mentally ill persons).72  
Subsection (1)(b) provides that, in such cases, the person’s previously 
acquired domicile will continue to be the relevant domicile for the 
purposes of this Act. 
ORS 31.865(1)(c) deals with persons who are legally capable of 
forming the intent to have a domicile in a given state but whose actual 
intent cannot be determined.  Subsection (1)(c) provides that, in such 
cases: (1) a person’s residence shall be treated as his or her domicile, 
and (2) if that person resides in more than one state, the state that has 
the most pertinent connection to the disputed issue is deemed to be 
the person’s domicile with regard to that issue. 
Subsection (2) of ORS 31.865 defines the domicile of a person 
“other than a natural person”—commonly referred to as legal person 
(e.g., corporations, associations, firms, partnerships, and other similar 
entities)—as the state in which that person has its principal place of 
business.  The question of where a legal person has its principal place 
of business is answered on a case-by-case basis through review of the 
person’s total activity and connections under the standards established 
by Oregon law. 
The second sentence of ORS 31.865(2) applies to situations in 
which a legal person has its principal place of business in one state, 
State A, and also has “a place of business” in another state, State B.  
That sentence provides that if the dispute arises from that person’s 
activities directed from State B (e.g., from its branch office located in 
State B), then either State A or State B may be treated as the legal 
person’s domicile at the choice of the other party. 
4.  “State” and “Law” 
ORS 31.850(8) provides a definition of “state” for the purposes of 
this Act.  The definition includes a foreign country and, in some 
instances, a territorial subdivision of a foreign country, such as a 
Canadian province or a Swiss canton—provided that the subdivision 
has its own system of law on the disputed issues.  The same 
qualification applies to recognized Indian tribes and other Native 
American, Hawaiian, or Alaskan groups.  To qualify as a state for the 
purposes of this Act, the subdivision or group must have its own 
system of laws on the disputed issues.  Conversely, a federation or a 
multinational entity, such as the European Union, may qualify as a 
 
72 See SCOLES, HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 6, at 271–83. 
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single country—and thus qualify as a “state” under this Act—if the 
federation or union has a single law on the disputed issues. 
The definition of state also includes the United States “unless the 
context requires otherwise.”  The context does not require otherwise 
when the United States stands on equal footing with another country 
(as in a maritime tort case that involves contacts with the United 
States and a foreign country), so that a choice between federal law 
and foreign law is necessary.  In contrast, the context does require 
otherwise when the United States stands in a hierarchically superior 
position vis-à-vis a state of the United States.  In such a context, the 
demarcation of the line between federal law and state law is not a 
matter of choosing between the two laws but rather is a question of 
determining the reach of federal law, a question answered by federal 
law principles.  If under those principles, the case falls within the 
reach of federal law, then federal law preempts any contrary state law.  
This Act does not purport to apply to such “vertical conflicts” 
between federal and state law.73 
ORS 31.850(4) defines “law” in a way that is intended to exclude 
the phenomenon known as renvoi.  This French word is generally 
used in the conflicts literature as shorthand for the practice by which 
the forum state applies the choice-of-law rules of another state, which 
may refer back to the law of the forum state (a “remission”) or to the 
law of a third state (a “transmission”).74  For practical purposes and 
other reasons, ORS 31.850(4) is intended to avoid this practice by 
confining any reference to foreign law to the internal or substantive 
law of the foreign state, excluding its choice-of-law rules. 
C.  Characterization, Localization, and Other Factual Determinations 
ORS 31.860(1) provides that the scope and meaning of terms and 
concepts employed in this Act are to be determined under Oregon 
law.  This is consistent with the generally accepted principle that 
“characterization”—namely, the classification of a given factual 
situation under the terms and categories employed by the forum’s 
choice-of-law rules—is conducted under the law of the forum.75 
 
73 For the distinction between “vertical” and “horizontal” conflicts, see SYMEONIDES, 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 70, at 17–19. 
74 For a general discussion of the renvoi phenomenon, see SCOLES, HAY, BORCHERS & 
SYMEONIDES, supra note 6, at 138–42; SYMEONIDES, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
supra note 70, at 81–83. 
75 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 7(2) (providing that 
“[t]he classification and interpretation of Conflict of Laws concepts and terms are 
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ORS 31.860(2) provides that the scope and meaning of terms 
employed by the law that is determined to be applicable under this 
Act, which may be the law of Oregon or that of another state, are 
determined under that law.76  For example, if the law of State X is 
applicable under the provisions of this Act and that law conditions the 
plaintiff’s recovery on proof of “gross negligence,” the meaning of 
“gross negligence” will be determined under the law of State X.  
Likewise, if State X prohibits recovery against “charitable entities,” 
the law of State X determines whether the entity involved qualifies as 
a “charitable entity.” 
According to ORS 31.855, the applicability of this Act depends on 
whether the claim is “noncontractual.”  ORS 31.862(1) provides that 
Oregon law (including this Act) determines whether a claim is 
“noncontractual.”  If the claim is “noncontractual” under Oregon law, 
this Act applies—even if, under this Act, the claim is governed by the 
law of another state that considers the claim contractual.  Conversely, 
if the claim is contractual under Oregon law, this Act is inapplicable 
and ORS 81.100 to 81.130 is applicable instead—even if, under ORS 
81.100 to 81.130, the claim is governed by the law of a state that 
characterizes the claim as noncontractual. 
“Localization” is the process of determining either the location of a 
contact or event upon which the choice of law depends, such as the 
location of the injurious conduct or the resulting injury, or the injured 
person’s domicile.77  Although in most instances this determination is 
a factual inquiry, it is guided by (and in some instances depends on) 
legal standards.  Primarily for practical reasons and in the interest of 
judicial economy, ORS 31.862 provides that this determination is to 
be made under Oregon law, even if the location of the particular 
contact is ultimately determined to be in another state. 
ORS 31.862 also provides specific rules to assist in the localization 
process in some cases, such as cases in which either the injurious 
conduct or the resulting injury occurred in more than one state.  Thus, 
if the conduct occurred in more than one state, the state in which the 
conduct that is “primarily responsible” for the injury occurred is to be 
considered the state of the “injurious conduct” for the purposes of the 
 
determined in accordance with the law of the forum”).  For characterization generally, see 
SCOLES, HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 6, at 122–37; SYMEONIDES, 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 70, at 75–76. 
76 Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 7(3). 
77 See SYMEONIDES, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 70, at 77. 
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Act.78  “If the same conduct cause[d] injury in more than one state, 
the place of injury is in the state in which most of the injurious effects 
occurred or may occur.”79 
ORS 31.862 also provides for cases involving more than one 
injured person or more than one person whose conduct allegedly 
caused the injury.80  Thus, under ORS 31.862(2), in a respondeat 
superior action filed against an employer for injury caused by an 
employee, both the employer and the employee are considered to be 
persons whose conduct caused the injury for the purposes of this Act.  
Likewise under subsection (4), in a claim for wrongful death or for 
loss of consortium, both the claimant and the physically injured or 
deceased person are considered to be “injured persons” for the 
purposes of this Act.81 
In some cases, questions such as (a) whether a person was actually 
injured, (b) whether the particular conduct actually caused the injury, 
and (c) whether a particular person was responsible for that conduct 
can only be answered after establishing the relevant facts.  Until then, 
strictly speaking, there is only an “allegedly” injured person, an 
“allegedly” injurious conduct, and a person whose conduct 
“allegedly” caused the injury. In these cases, the quoted word is 
implied, even if it cannot be used in the text of the Act.82 
IV 
CLAIMS DIRECTLY GOVERNED BY FORUM LAW 
In the interest of judicial economy, as well as protecting Oregon’s 
policies or the parties’ justifiable reliance on Oregon law, ORS 
31.870 and 31.872 list certain noncontractual claims that are directly 
 
78 OR. REV. STAT. § 31.862(1) (2009). 
79 § 31.862(3).  This subsection also provides that, “[i]f different persons suffer injury in 
different states by reason of the same conduct, the place of injury is determined separately 
for each person.”  Id. 
80 See § 31.862(2)–(4). 
81 § 31.862(4).  The terms “injured person” and “plaintiff” are not necessarily 
synonymous.  For example, the plaintiff may simply be the assignee or subrogee of the 
injured person.  By consistently using the term “injured person” rather than the term 
“plaintiff,” this Act signifies that in cases where these two terms do not coincide in the 
same person, only the former and not the latter term is relevant for purposes of the Act. 
82 A more accurate phrase might be the person “claimed” to have caused the injury, 
“claimed to be liable” (which is used in the European Union’s Rome II Regulation), or 
perhaps some other even longer and more awkward phrase.  See Regulation (EC) No. 
864/2007 on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations (Rome II), art. 4(2), 
2007 O.J. (L 199) 40. 
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or automatically governed by Oregon law, notwithstanding other 
provisions of this Act.  If a claim falls within the list, the court or 
other decision maker should apply Oregon law without conducting a 
choice-of-law inquiry.  In doctrinal terms, ORS 31.870 and 31.872 
consist of “unilateral” choice-of-law rules, namely, rules that mandate 
the application of the law of the forum state to cases that have certain 
contacts with that state without addressing the question of which law 
governs analogous cases that lack those contacts.  In this case, 
however, the unilateral rules of ORS 31.870 and 31.872 are 
supplemented by the “multilateral” rules of ORS 31.875 through 
31.885, which designate the applicable law (be it of the forum state or 
of another state) for all remaining cases.83 
A.  The List of ORS 31.870 
The list of ORS 31.870 can be divided into two parts.  The first 
part, consisting of subsections (1) through (3), provides for cases in 
which the parties have agreed or acquiesced to the application of 
Oregon law.  ORS 31.870(1) provides that if, “after the events giving 
rise to the dispute, the parties agree to the application of Oregon law,” 
then the agreement, if otherwise valid, will be enforceable and 
Oregon law will govern the dispute.84  ORS 31.870 subsections (2) 
and (3) provide that Oregon law also governs if none of the litigants 
“raises the issue of applicability of foreign law,” or if the litigant or 
litigants “who rely on foreign law fail to assist the court in 
establishing the relevant provisions of foreign law after being 
requested by the court to do so.”85  Both of these provisions are 
consistent with current judicial practice in Oregon and other states of 
the United States.86 
The second part of ORS 31.870, consisting of subsections (4) 
through (7), lists four categories of cases in which Oregon’s contacts 
are of the kind that would probably lead to the choice of Oregon law 
 
83 For the difference between “unilateralism” and “multilateralism” (or “bilateralism”), 
see Symeon C. Symeonides, Accommodative Unilateralism as a Starting Premise in 
Choice of Law, in PETER HAY, BALANCING OF INTERESTS: LIBER AMICORUM 417–34 
(Hans-Eric Rasmussen-Bonne et al. eds., 2005). 
84 § 31.870(1).  For cases in which the parties agree to the application of the law of a 
state other than Oregon, see infra Part V.A. 
85 § 31.870(2), (3). 
86 See MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 70, at 440–45; SCOLES, HAY, BORCHERS & 
SYMEONIDES, supra note 6, at 543–46; SYMEONIDES, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
supra note 70, at 89–91; WEINTRAUB, supra note 70, at 112–16. 
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regardless of which modern choice-of-law methodology one might 
follow.  For this reason, and in the interest of judicial economy, ORS 
31.870 exempts these cases from a judicial choice-of-law analysis and 
directly subjects them to Oregon law. 
Thus, ORS 31.870(4) provides that Oregon law applies in actions 
for noncontractual claims filed against the State of Oregon or any of 
its agencies or subdivisions or other public bodies as defined in ORS 
31.850(7)—“unless the application of Oregon law is waived by a 
person authorized by Oregon law to make the waiver.”87  Under ORS 
31.860(1), Oregon law (including this Act) determines whether an 
entity is an agency or subdivision of the State of Oregon or a “public 
body.”  ORS 31.850(7) defines a “public body” of the State of Oregon 
through a reference to ORS 174.109, which states that “‘public body’ 
means state government bodies, local government bodies and special 
government bodies.”88  Subsequent provisions define state 
governmental bodies,89 local governmental bodies,90 and special 
governmental bodies.91  ORS 31.850(7) adds the Oregon Health and 
Science University and the Oregon State Bar to this list of public 
bodies so as to ensure that these two entities, which ORS 174.108(3) 
excludes from the definition of public body, will be covered by this 
Act. 
ORS 31.870(5) provides that Oregon law governs actions filed 
against the owner, possessor, or lessor of land, buildings, or other real 
property situated in Oregon, seeking to recover for injury occurring 
on such property, if the injurious conduct also occurred in Oregon.  
Oregon law also governs actions seeking to prevent injury on such 
property if the impending or threatened conduct is expected to occur 
in Oregon. 
ORS 31.870(6) provides that Oregon law governs actions for 
noncontractual claims between an employer and an employee 
“primarily” employed in Oregon, if the claim arises from injury in 
Oregon.  Whether the employment meets this condition is a question 
of fact to be decided under Oregon law.  By way of comparison, ORS 
656.126 (Oregon’s workers’ compensation statute) applies to workers 
 
87 § 31.870(4).  For a similar provision regarding certain contractual claims by or 
against the State of Oregon and other Oregon public bodies, see § 81.105(1). 
88 OR. REV. STAT. § 174.109 (2009). 
89 See §§ 174.111–.114. 
90 See § 174.116. 
91 See § 174.117. 
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“employed in this state,” even if the workers are injured elsewhere.92  
Conversely, the same statute exempts certain workers “from another 
state” and injured in Oregon from its scope.93 
Finally, ORS 31.870(7) provides that Oregon law applies to 
noncontractual claims in actions for professional malpractice arising 
from professional services rendered entirely in Oregon if the provider 
of these services was licensed under Oregon law.  In such cases, 
professionals rendering services in Oregon must comply with (and 
will be held accountable pursuant to) standards established by Oregon 
law, even if the recipient of the services is domiciled in another state. 
It should be noted that, for claims that fall within the scope of ORS 
31.870, Oregon law applies without any exceptions because, unlike 
other sections of the Act, ORS 31.870 does not contain any escape.  
Also, under ORS 31.870, Oregon law applies “[n]otwithstanding ORS 
31.875, 31.878 and 31.885” of the Act.94  In other words, ORS 31.870 
prevails over the excluded sections, albeit for different reasons.  It 
prevails over ORS 31.875 and 31.878 because it is more specific, and 
prevails over ORS 31.885, which permits the contractual choice of 
non-Oregon law, because a contrary rule would defeat the reason for 
mandating the application of Oregon law under ORS 31.870.  
Purposefully, the above-quoted phrase does not list ORS 31.880—
which provides for claims by and against third parties—among the 
excluded sections.  ORS 31.870 therefore coexists with ORS 31.880.  
This coexistence means that ORS 31.870 applies only between the 
plaintiff (and those parties asserting claims through the plaintiff) and 
the defendant (and those responsible for defendant’s conduct), while 
ORS 31.880 applies to claims by and against third parties. 
B.  Products Liability Claims 
ORS 31.872 provides that certain products liability actions in 
which Oregon has the specified contacts are to be governed by 
Oregon law “[n]otwithstanding ORS 31.875 and 31.878”95 of the Act 
 
92 See OR. REV. STAT. § 656.126(1) (2009).  For a discussion of this provision, see 
supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
93 See § 656.126(2) (“Any worker from another state and the employer of the worker in 
that other state are exempted from the provisions of this chapter while that worker is 
temporarily within this state doing work for the employer . . . .”). 
94 OR. REV. STAT. § 31.870 (2009). 
95 § 31.872(1). 
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and without any judicial choice-of-law inquiry.96  The quoted phrase 
underscores that, for claims falling within its scope, ORS 31.872 is 
more specific than ORS 31.875 and 31.878 and thus prevails over 
them.  In this sense, ORS 31.872 is similar to ORS 31.870, which also 
prevails over ORS 31.875 and 31.878, but not to ORS 31.880, which 
applies to claims involving third parties.  However, ORS 31.872 
differs from ORS 31.870 in the following two important respects: (1) 
Unlike ORS 31.870, which does not allow exceptions to the 
application of Oregon law, ORS 31.872 provides two such 
exceptions, discussed below;97 and (2) Unlike ORS 31.870, which 
does not allow a contractual choice of non-Oregon law, ORS 31.872 
permits such a choice—provided it is made after the parties had 
knowledge of the events giving rise to the dispute and meets the other 
requirements of ORS 31.885.98 
ORS 31.872 applies to “product liability civil actions, as defined in 
ORS 30.900.”99  The latter provision defines a “product liability civil 
action” as 
a civil action brought against a manufacturer, distributor, seller or 
lessor of a product for damages for personal injury, death or 
property damage arising out of: 
 (1) Any design, inspection, testing, manufacturing or other 
defect in a product; 
 (2) Any failure to warn regarding a product; or 
 (3) Any failure to properly instruct in the use of a product.100 
Like the Act as a whole, ORS 31.872 applies only to 
noncontractual claims.  For contractual claims, such as certain claims 
for breach of warranty, the applicable choice-of-law statutes are ORS 
81.100 to 81.135.  One practical difference between the two statutes is 
that while the contracts statute allows predispute choice-of-law 
agreements within the limits specified in ORS 81.120 and 81.125, the 
new Act allows such agreements only if they are entered into after the 
parties had knowledge of the events giving rise to the dispute.101 
 
96 For a similar provision, see LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3545 (2009); Symeonides, 
Louisiana’s New Law, supra note 3, at 749–59. 
97 See infra note 287 and accompanying text. 
98 See infra notes 129–31 and accompanying text. 
99 § 31.872(1). 
100 § 30.900. 
101 See § 31.885.  For further discussion, see infra notes 128–35 and accompanying text. 
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ORS 31.872 applies only to the noncontractual claims and counter-
claims between, on the one hand, the injured person as defined under 
ORS 31.862 (and those who assert claims through that person) and, 
on the other hand, a person who may be a defendant in a products 
liability action as defined in ORS 30.900, such as a manufacturer, 
distributor, seller, or lessor of a product.  Claims by or against third 
parties or between joint tortfeasors are covered by ORS 31.880, which 
in turn refers them to ORS 31.878. 
Finally, ORS 31.872 applies only to cases in which Oregon has the 
contacts enumerated in that provision.102  As stated in ORS 
31.872(4), cases in which Oregon lacks these contacts are governed 
by the law selected under ORS 31.878, the residual section of this 
Act.103  Depending on the circumstances, that law may be the law of 
Oregon or that of another state. 
Under ORS 31.872(1), the application of Oregon law depends on 
specified combinations of four Oregon contacts: (1) the domicile of 
the injured person, (2) the place of injury, (3) the manufacture or 
production of the product, and (4) the delivery of the product when 
new in Oregon for use or consumption in Oregon.  The following 
table shows the various possible combinations. 
 
102 § 31.872.  The presence of these contacts will usually—but not always—mean that 
Oregon courts will have jurisdiction to adjudicate these cases.  However, the jurisdictional 
inquiry is different from the choice-of-law inquiry. 
103 In some of these cases, Oregon courts will not have jurisdiction. In those instances, 
the applicability of this Act would be a moot question, except to the extent that courts in 
other states may choose to consider ORS 31.872 and 31.878 under the doctrine of renvoi 
or similar reasoning. 
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TABLE 1 
Products Liability Cases Governed by Oregon Law Under 
ORS 31.872104 
 Case 
# 
Victim’s 
domicile 
Injury Delivery 
“as new” 
Mnfg. Applicable 
provision 
Applicable 
law 
4 
contacts 
1 OR OR OR OR § 31.872(1) OR 
3 
contacts 
2 --- OR OR OR § 31.872 (1) OR 
3 OR --- OR OR § 31.872 (1) OR 
4 OR OR --- OR § 31.872 (1) OR 
5 OR OR OR --- § 31.872 (1) OR 
2 
contacts 
6 OR OR --- --- § 31.872 (1)(a) OR 
7 OR --- OR --- § 31.872 
(1)(b)(B) 
OR 
8 OR --- --- OR § 31.872 
(1)(b)(A) 
OR 
9 --- OR OR --- § 31.872 
(1)(b)(B) 
OR 
10 --- OR  OR § 31.872 
(1)(b)(A) 
OR 
11 --- --- OR OR § 31.872 (4) 
and § 31.878 
? 
1 
contact 
12 OR --- --- --- § 31.872 (4) 
and § 31.878 
? 
13 --- OR --- --- § 31.872 (4) 
and § 31.878 
? 
14 --- --- OR --- § 31.872 (4) 
and § 31.878 
? 
15 --- --- --- OR § 31.872 (4) 
and § 31.878 
? 
16 --- --- --- --- § 31.872 (4) 
and § 31.878 
? 
ORS 31.872(1) provides that, with only one exception,105  Oregon 
law governs all cases in which any two or more of the aforementioned 
four contacts are situated in Oregon.  These cases are indicated by 
shading in the last column of the above Table (Cases 1–10).  Thus, 
Oregon law applies under subsection (1): 
 
104 For exceptions to the application of Oregon law, see the escapes of § 31.872(2)–(3).  
See also discussion infra note 287 and accompanying text. 
105 The exception covers cases in which Oregon’s only two contacts are the 
manufacture or production of the product in the state and the delivery of the product in the 
state.  See Case 11 in TABLE 1, supra p. 989. 
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(1) if, at the time of the injury, the injured person was domiciled in 
Oregon,106 and Oregon was also: (a) the place of injury, (b) the 
place of the product’s manufacture, or (c) the place of the 
product’s delivery as new;107or 
(2) if the injury occurred in Oregon, and Oregon was also: (a) the 
place of the product’s manufacture, or (b) the place of the 
product’s delivery as new.108 
The phrase “delivered when new” for use or consumption in 
Oregon under subsection (1)(b) is intended to exclude second-hand 
products that first entered Oregon in used condition.  This exclusion 
will make a difference only when the application of Oregon law 
depends on this contact because Oregon lacks other contact 
combinations for applying Oregon law under subsection (1).  This 
will be the case if the product first entered Oregon in used condition 
and Oregon had only one of the other three contacts listed in 
subsection (1).109  In such a case, the claim will fall outside the scope 
of ORS 31.872 and will be governed by the law selected under ORS 
31.878. 
Subsections (2) and (3) of ORS 31.872 provide two exceptions to 
the application of Oregon law under subsection (1).  The first 
exception operates for the entire claim; whereas the second exception 
operates on an issue-by-issue basis.110 
Subsection (2) provides the first exception to the defendant, who 
must carry the burden of persuasion for the exception’s deployment.  
The defendant can avoid the application of Oregon law by 
demonstrating to the court’s satisfaction: (1) that the use in Oregon of 
the particular product that caused the injury could not have been 
foreseen (this is an objective test), and (2) that none of the 
defendant’s products of the same type were available in Oregon in the 
ordinary course of trade.111  If the defendant satisfies both of these 
 
106 As provided by ORS 31.865(3), a person’s domicile is determined as of the date of 
the injury upon which the noncontractual claim is based.  This is why ORS 31.872(1) uses 
the past tense when referring to the domicile of the injured person.  However, a postinjury 
change of domicile may be a relevant factor in determining whether to employ the escape 
clause of ORS 31.872(2)(b).  See infra note 287 and accompanying text. 
107 See Cases 1 and 3–8 in TABLE 1, supra p. 989. 
108 See Cases 2 and 9–10 in TABLE 1, supra p. 989. 
109 See Cases 7 and 9 in TABLE 1, supra p. 989. 
110 Issue-by-issue analysis is discussed infra at Part V.D. 
111 Other codifications provide similar exceptions that nonetheless differ in some 
important respects.  See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3545 (2009) (stating forum law 
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requirements, the entire claim will be governed by the law selected 
under ORS 31.878 of this Act.112 
Subsection (3) of ORS 31.872 makes the second exception 
available to both defendants and plaintiffs.  Either party can avoid the 
application of Oregon law under ORS 31.872 by demonstrating that, 
under the principles of ORS 31.878, the application to a disputed 
issue of the law of a state other than Oregon would be “substantially 
more appropriate” for that issue.113  In such a case, that issue will be 
governed by the law of the other state, while the remaining issues (if 
any) will be governed by Oregon law.  The rationale for this 
exception is the same as that of a similar clause in ORS 31.875(4), 
which is discussed later.114 
Subsection (4) of ORS 31.872 provides that noncontractual claims 
or issues in products liability actions falling outside the scope of ORS 
31.872(1) are governed by the law selected under ORS 31.878.  As 
noted earlier, these are cases in which Oregon lacks the combination 
of contacts required by ORS 31.872(1).  The reference to ORS 31.878 
does not preclude the application of Oregon law under that provision. 
ORS 31.872(4) also refers to ORS 31.878 all claims falling within 
the scope of subsection (1) but “not disposed of” under subsections 
(1) through (3).  These are cases in which a party carries the burden of 
satisfying the requirements of one of the exceptions provided in 
subsections (2) or (3) of ORS 31.872. 
In summary, ORS 31.872 adopts a very pragmatic solution for 
products liability conflicts, which are an inherently difficult category 
of conflicts.  Indeed, American courts have struggled with these 
 
does not apply “if neither the product that caused the injury nor any of the defendant’s 
products of the same type were made available in [the forum] state through ordinary 
commercial channels”); Rome II, supra note 82, art. 5 (stating the otherwise applicable 
law does not apply if the defendant “could not reasonably foresee the marketing of the 
product, or a product of the same type, in the country the law of which is applicable”); 
Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability, art. 7, Oct. 2, 1973, 1056 
U.N.T.S. 187 (stating the otherwise applicable law does not apply “if the person claimed 
to be liable establishes that he could not reasonably have foreseen that the product or his 
own products of the same type would be made available in that State through commercial 
channels”). 
112 The claim will then become an “undisposed” claim, which ORS 31.872(4) refers to 
ORS 31.878.  For a discussion of ORS 31.878, see infra Part V.C. 
113 OR. REV. STAT. § 31.872(3) (2009). 
114 See infra notes 290–91 and accompanying text. 
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conflicts,115 as have foreign or domestic rule makers.116  ORS 31.872 
ensures that those cases that have sufficient contacts with Oregon to 
justify the application of Oregon law will be governed by that law, 
except when either of the two exceptions is found applicable.  Most of 
the cases that lack these contacts will probably not be litigated in 
Oregon, either due to lack of jurisdiction or for other reasons.  The 
few cases that will be litigated in Oregon will probably be too 
variable to be susceptible to a hard and fast rule.  That is why ORS 
31.872(4) refers these cases to the flexible approach of ORS 31.878. 
As noted earlier, this Act does “not supersede” (and, in fact, gives 
priority to) choice-of-law provisions found in other Oregon 
statutes.117  One such statute is ORS 30.905, which establishes time 
limitations within which a claimant must assert a products liability 
action.  In 2009, the Oregon Legislature amended this statute to 
provide for the applicable statute of repose in certain products liability 
actions involving products manufactured outside Oregon.  The statute 
differentiates between actions for personal injury or property, on the 
one hand, and actions arising from death, on the other hand.  In 
personal injury or property damage cases, the action must be brought 
within ten years of the product’s first purchase or within the period 
provided by the statute of repose of the state of manufacture, 
whichever period is longer.118  In claims arising from death, the 
action must be brought within three years from the death, ten years 
from the product’s first purchase, or the period provided by the statute 
of repose of the state of manufacture, whichever period is shorter.119  
Under the scheme of ORS 31.855, the aforementioned provisions of 
ORS 30.905 take precedence over the provisions of this Act, if only 
because they are more specific on the issue of the timeliness of a 
products liability action.  This precedence means that these provisions 
will apply not only to cases governed by Oregon law under ORS 
 
115 For a discussion of how American courts have handled products-liability conflicts in 
the last two decades, see Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law for Products Liability: 
The 1990s and Beyond, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1247 (2004). 
116 For a survey of enacted or proposed choice-of-law rules for products liability, see 
SCOLES, HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 6, at 934–41. 
117 See § 31.855.  For a discussion, see supra Part III.A. 
118 § 30.905(2) (as amended by 2009 Or. Laws 485 (S.B. 284)).  If the product was 
manufactured in another country, the U.S. state “into which the product was imported” 
replaces the state of manufacture.  Id. 
119 § 30.905(4) (as amended by 2009 Or. Laws 485 (S.B. 284)).  If the product was 
manufactured in another country, the U.S. state “into which the product was imported” 
replaces the state of manufacture.  Id. 
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31.872(1) (e.g., Cases 1-10 of TABLE 1, above), but also to cases that 
ORS 31.872(4) refers to ORS 31.878 and on other issues may be 
governed by the law of a state other than Oregon.120  This further 
means that, depending on the pertinent contingencies: (1) the 
timeliness of an action that is otherwise governed by Oregon law 
under ORS 31.872(1) may be determined under the statute of repose 
of another state in which the product was manufactured; and 
conversely, (2) the timeliness of an action that is otherwise governed 
by the law of another state under ORS 31.878 may be determined 
under Oregon’s statute of repose. 
V 
CLAIMS GOVERNED BY EITHER FORUM OR FOREIGN LAW 
When a case lacks the contacts that lead to the automatic 
application of Oregon law under ORS 31.870 or 31.872, the choice of 
law is to be made under ORS 31.875 through 31.885.  ORS 31.885 
addresses the enforceability of choice-of-law agreements, while ORS 
31.875 through 31.880 apply in the absence of such an agreement.  
ORS 31.875 applies to claims between the injured person and the 
person whose conduct caused the injury, ORS 31.880 applies to 
claims between or among third parties, and ORS 31.878 is the default 
rule that applies when not displaced by other provisions of the Act. 
A.  Choice-of-Law Agreements 
As noted earlier, this Act applies to noncontractual claims, whereas 
ORS 81.100 to 81.135 (“the contracts statute”) applies to contractual 
claims.121  With regard to contractual claims, the principle of party 
autonomy is old, broad, and uncontested.122  This principle 
recognizes the freedom of contracting parties to agree in advance (as 
well as after the fact) on the law under which to resolve their 
contractual claims—as long as the agreement does not violate the 
 
120 The remaining question is whether the provisions described above of ORS 30.905 
also prevail over the provisions of ORS 12.410 to 12.480 (the Uniform Conflict of Laws-
Limitations Act).  This question is beyond the scope of this Article.  For what it is worth, 
this author’s opinion is that ORS 30.905 should prevail. 
121 For a discussion of this statute, see the sources cited supra note 43. 
122 By now, this principle is “perhaps the most widely accepted private international law 
rule of our time.”  Russell J. Weintraub, Functional Developments in Choice of Law for 
Contracts, 187 RECUEIL DES COURS 239, 271 (1984). For a discussion of party autonomy 
and its limitations in contracts, see SCOLES, HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 
6, at 947–87; SYMEONIDES, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 70, at 197–223. 
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public policy or certain nonwaivable rules of the state's law that 
would govern in the absence of such an agreement.  Virtually all legal 
systems recognize this principle and, as ORS 81.120 and 81.125 
illustrate, so does Oregon. ORS 81.120(1) provides that, subject to 
certain conditions and limitations specified therein, “the contractual 
rights and duties of the parties are governed by the law or laws that 
the parties have chosen.”123  The italicized word, which was 
deliberately chosen in drafting that provision, limits the permissible 
scope of a choice-of-law agreement to contractual issues.124 
Whether the principle of party autonomy should extend to 
noncontractual claims is a relatively new question, one which has yet 
to receive a clear or uniform answer. In other words, do contracting 
parties have the power to choose in advance the law that will govern a 
future tort between them or other noncontractual claims arising from 
or related to their relationship?  Section 187 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Conflict of Laws, which is followed by the majority of 
jurisdictions in the United States, speaks of the law of the state chosen 
by the parties to govern their “contractual rights and duties”125 and 
contains no provision regarding the agreements for noncontractual 
claims.  Many cases apply section 187 literally and hold that the 
parties’ power to choose the applicable law in advance is confined to 
contractual issues.  However, some cases assume that parties are free 
to submit noncontractual issues to the chosen law, provided that the 
parties use clear and unambiguous language expressing such an 
intent.  At the same time, these cases also tend to scrutinize clauses 
that purport to encompass noncontractual issues much more closely 
than clauses confined to purely contractual issues.  More often than 
not, these cases either construe the clause to exclude tort issues or 
conclude that the clause is unenforceable as contrary to public 
policy.126  In contrast, the European Union’s Rome II Regulation 
 
123 OR. REV. STAT. § 81.120(1) (2009) (emphasis added). 
124 See Official Comments to H.B. 2414, 2001 Or. Laws 164 § 7, cmt. 1 (codified in 
part as OR. REV. STAT. § 81.120 (2009)).  As the Comments note, the quoted provision 
“makes clear that the exercise of party autonomy within this Act extends only to 
contractual rights and duties of the parties and not to non-contractual rights and duties 
such as those arising out of the law of torts and property.”  Id. (published in Nafziger, 
supra note 43, at 420); Symeonides, Oregon’s Choice-of-Law Codification for Contract 
Conflicts, supra note 12, at 223–26 (explaining the exclusion of noncontractual claims). 
125 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2) (1971) (emphasis added). 
126 For citations, see SYMEONIDES, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 70, at 
212–14; Symeonides, Oregon’s Choice-of-Law Codification for Contract Conflicts, supra 
note 12, at 224–25. 
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allows predispute choice-of-law agreements for noncontractual issues 
if: (1) the parties are “pursuing a commercial activity,” (2) the 
agreement is “freely negotiated,” and (3) the contractually chosen law 
does not derogate from the mandatory rules of a state in which “all 
the elements relevant to the situation . . . are located” or, in certain 
cases, from the mandatory rules of community law.127 
This Act breaks new ground in the United States by addressing 
choice-of-law agreements with regard to noncontractual claims.  The 
Act differentiates between agreements entered into before the events 
giving rise to the dispute (predispute) and those entered into after the 
parties had knowledge of the events giving rise to the dispute (post-
dispute).  The reason for this differentiation is that the parties’ 
position in the two situations is qualitatively and significantly 
different.  Before the dispute arises, the parties (assuming they are 
otherwise contractually related) usually do not—or should not—
contemplate a future tort, and the parties do not know (1) who will 
injure whom or (2) the nature or severity of the injury.  An 
unsophisticated party (or a party in a weak bargaining position) may 
uncritically or unwittingly sign a choice-of-law agreement—even 
when the odds of that party becoming the victim are much higher than 
the odds of that party becoming the tortfeasor.  Thus, predispute 
agreements may facilitate the exploitation of weak parties.  In 
contrast, this danger is less pronounced in postdispute agreements 
because, after the dispute arises, the parties are in a position to know 
their rights and obligations and have the opportunity to weigh the pros 
and cons of a choice-of-law agreement.  This is why the Act permits 
postdispute choice-of-law agreements but does not sanction 
predispute agreements for noncontractual claims. 
The Act differentiates between postdispute agreements choosing 
Oregon law and post-dispute agreements choosing the law of another 
state.  According to ORS 31.870(1), postdispute agreements choosing 
Oregon law are enforceable without any limitation—if the agreements 
are otherwise valid.128 
 
127 Rome II, supra note 82, art. 14.  For a critique of this provision, see Symeon C. 
Symeonides, Rome II and Tort Conflicts: A Missed Opportunity, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 173, 
215–17 (2008) (criticizing this provision for its failure to protect weak parties in certain 
commercial relationships, such as franchises); Symeon C. Symeonides, Party Autonomy in 
Rome I and II from a Comparative Perspective, in CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE IN 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW—LIBER AMICORUM KURT SIEHR (K. Boele-Woelki, T. 
Einhorn, D. Girsberger & S. Symeonides eds., forthcoming 2010) [hereinafter 
Symeonides, Party Autonomy]. 
128 See supra Part IV.A. 
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ORS 31.885 applies to postdispute agreements choosing the law of 
a state other than Oregon.  ORS 31.885 provides that such agreements 
are enforceable provided they conform to the pertinent provisions of 
ORS 81.100 to 81.135, which establish the requirements for enforcing 
choice-of-law agreements regarding contractual claims.129  Among 
these requirements are that the agreement: (1) must be formally and 
substantively valid under the law applicable to those issues under 
ORS 81.105 to 81.115, or 81.130 to 81.135; (2) “must be express or 
clearly demonstrated from the terms of the contract” and, in a 
standard form contract drafted primarily by only one of the parties, 
the agreement “must be express and conspicuous”;130 and (3) must 
remain within the limits of party autonomy as defined by ORS 
81.125.  The latter section provides, inter alia, that the contractually 
chosen law does not apply to the extent that its application would 
“[c]ontravene an established fundamental policy embodied in the law 
that would otherwise govern the issue in dispute” in the absence of 
such agreement.131 
By resolving the choice-of-law aspect of a dispute, choice-of-law 
agreements can facilitate a voluntary settlement of the whole dispute 
without litigation.  Even when litigation is not avoided, choice-of-law 
agreements can reduce the duration and costs of litigation and make it 
more predictable.  Thus, choice-of-law agreements serve interests 
beyond those of the parties, such as the interest in conserving judicial 
resources.  For this reason, ORS 31.885 and ORS 31.870(1) should be 
viewed as expressions of a legislative policy in favor of choice-of-law 
agreements and an invitation to courts to encourage parties to reach 
such agreements.132 
 
129 ORS 81.102 also preserves the applicability of other Oregon statutes regarding such 
agreements.  For a list of these statutes, see Official Comments to H.B. 2414, 2001 Or. 
Laws 164 § 2, cmt. 1 (codified in part as OR. REV. STAT. § 81.102 (2009)) (published in 
Nafziger, supra note 43, at 419). 
130 OR. REV. STAT. § 81.120(2) (2009). 
131 § 81.125(1)(c).  Subsection (2) of the same section provides that “an established 
policy is fundamental only if the policy reflects objectives or gives effect to essential 
public or societal institutions beyond the allocation of rights and obligations of parties to a 
contract at issue.”  § 81.125(2).  For a discussion of this provision, see Symeonides, 
Oregon’s Choice-of-Law Codification for Contract Conflicts, supra note 12, at 231–35. 
132 See generally James A.R. Nafziger, Avoiding Courtroom “Conflicts” Whenever 
Possible, in LAW AND JUSTICE IN A MULTISTATE WORLD: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ARTHUR 
T. VON MEHREN 341 (James A.R. Nafziger & Symeon C. Symeonides eds., 2002); James 
A.R. Nafziger, Commentary, Making Choices of Law Together, 37 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 
209 (2001); James A.R. Nafziger, Avoidance of Choice-of-Law Conflicts: An Introduction, 
12 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 179 (2004). 
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ORS 31.885 does not by itself prohibit parties from agreeing to 
submit a noncontractual dispute to arbitration.133  The validity of an 
arbitration agreement is governed by general contract principles.  
Moreover when the arbitration agreement is valid, this Act is not 
binding on the arbitral tribunal, unless the agreement expressly 
provides otherwise.  ORS 36.508 provides in pertinent part that the 
arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute “in accordance with the rules 
of law designated by the parties as applicable to the substance of the 
dispute” and that the designation of the law of a given state “shall be 
construed, unless otherwise expressed, as directly referring to the 
substantive law of that state and not to its conflict-of-laws rules.”134  
As part of Oregon’s conflicts law, this Act will be binding on the 
arbitral tribunal only if the arbitration agreement expressly provides 
to that effect.  ORS 36.508 also provides that if the arbitration 
agreement does not designate the applicable law, then “the arbitral 
tribunal shall apply the rules of law it considers to be appropriate 
given all the circumstances surrounding the dispute.”135  In such a 
case, the tribunal may choose to be guided by the provisions of this 
Act in identifying the “appropriate” rules of law. 
B.  The General Rules of ORS 31.875 
In the absence of a choice-of-law agreement that is enforceable 
under ORS 31.885, the court or other decision maker should turn to 
ORS 31.875, which is the heart of the Act.  ORS 31.875 provides the 
general rules for determining the law applicable to claims not covered 
by the more specific ORS 31.870, 31.872, 31.880, and 31.885.  The 
rules of ORS 31.875 apply only to claims and counter-claims between 
the “injured person” (and those parties asserting claims through that 
person) and “the person whose conduct caused the injury” (and those 
responsible for that person).136  For claims by or against third parties 
or between or among joint tortfeasors, the applicable law is 
 
133 For choice-of-law issues in interstate and international arbitration, see SYMEONIDES, 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 70, at 217–23. 
134 OR. REV. STAT. § 36.508(1), (2) (2009) (emphasis added). 
135 § 36.508(3). 
136 § 31.875(1).  The “injured person” and “the person whose conduct caused the 
injury” are determined under Oregon law as provided in ORS 31.860 and ORS 31.862.  
ORS 31.862 also provides that Oregon law determines what constitutes “injurious 
conduct” or “conduct that caused the injury” and where that conduct and the resulting 
injury occurred.  § 31.862. 
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determined under ORS 31.880, which in turn relegates them to the 
flexible approach of ORS 31.878.137 
Under ORS 31.875, the choice of the governing law depends in 
part on the location of four contacts: (1) the place of the injurious 
conduct, (2) the place of the resulting injury, (3) the domicile of the 
injured person, and (4) the domicile of the person whose conduct 
caused the injury.  The following table illustrates the operation of 
ORS 31.875 by showing the various contact combinations or patterns 
that fall within its scope as well as the applicable law (indicated by 
shading). 
 
137 The reason for relegating these claims to the flexible approach of ORS 31.878 is that 
their complexity and variability make them insusceptible to categorical choice-of-law 
rules.  For example, there is no guarantee that the choice-of-law rules of ORS 31.875 will 
produce sound results in all cases involving these types of third-party claims, although in 
some cases these rules can provide valuable pointers.  In many cases, it may be appropriate 
to apply the same law to these claims as that which governs the claims between the injured 
person and the person who caused the injury; while in other cases, it may be more 
appropriate to apply the law of another state.  The approach of ORS 31.878 provides 
courts with sufficient flexibility to evaluate the complexities and peculiarities of each 
claim in an individualized way and decide accordingly. 
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TABLE 2 
Cases Covered by ORS 31.875 138 
  # P’s Dom. Injury Conduct D’s Dom. 
Subsection 
(2)(a) Common-domicile cases 
1 A B B A 
2 A B C A 
3 A A B A 
4 A b A A 
5 A B c A 
6 A b C A 
7 A b c A 
8 A b b A 
9 A b b A 
10 A b c A 
11 A a B A 
12 A B a A 
13 A B c A 
14 A b C A 
15 A B C A 
16 A B B A 
Subsection 
(2)(b) 
Cases analogous to common-
domicile cases 
17 A --- --- B 
18 A --- --- B 
Subsection 
(3)(a) 
Split-domicile but conduct and 
injury in one domiciliary state 
19 A A A B 
20 A B B B 
21 A B B B 
22 A A A B 
Subsection 
(3)(b) 
Split-domicile and conduct and 
injury in the same third state 
23 A C C B 
24 A C C B 
25 a C C B 
26 A C C B 
Subsection 
(3)(c) Split-domicile, cross-border torts 
27 a a B B 
28 c a B B 
29 a a B C 
30 d a B C 
 
138 Cases 1–18 are subject to an exception for the issue of “standard of care.”  See § 
31.875(2)(a); see also discussion infra Part V.B.1.b.  Cases 23–26 are subject to an escape 
if the application of the law of State C “will not serve the objectives of that law.”  See § 
31.875(3)(b); see also discussion infra Part V.B.3.b.  All cases (1–36) are subject to a 
general escape if the application of another law is “substantially more appropriate under 
the principles of ORS 31.878.”  See § 31.875(4); see also infra notes 290–91 and 
accompanying text. 
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  # P’s Dom. Injury Conduct D’s Dom. 
31 D a B C 
32 A A b B 
33 A A b C 
34 D A b C 
35 D A b B 
36 d A b C 
In this and all subsequent tables: (1) the letters in the last four 
columns represent states that have the contacts shown at the top of 
each column; (2) the use of a capital letter indicates that the state 
represented in that cell has a pro-recovery law, while the use of a 
lower-case letter indicates that the state represented in that cell has a 
law that does not favor recovery; (3) the dash (---) indicates that the 
law of that state is immaterial; and (4) shaded cells indicate the state 
of the law applicable under ORS 31.875. 
1.  Common-Domicile Cases 
ORS 31.875(2)(a) deals with situations in which, at the time of the 
injury, the injured person and the person whose conduct caused the 
injury were domiciled in the same state.139  The first sentence of this 
subsection provides that these cases are to be governed by the law of 
the common domicile—even if the injurious conduct, the resulting 
injury, or both occurred in another state or states with a different (or 
the same) law than that of the common domicile.  This sentence is 
hereinafter referred to as the “common-domicile rule.” 
The second sentence of subsection (2)(a) introduces a limitation to 
the scope of the common-domicile rule by exempting from it the issue 
of determining the standard of care by which to judge the injurious 
conduct.  That sentence, hereinafter referred to as “the exception” 
from the common-domicile rule, provides that this issue is governed 
by the law of the state of conduct if the resulting injury also occurred 
in that state.  If the injury occurred in a state other than the state of 
conduct, the applicable law is determined under subsection (3)(c), 
 
139 The rules for determining the domicile of a natural person or a legal person are 
found in ORS 31.865 and are discussed supra Part III.B.3.  Subsection (2)(b) of ORS 
31.875 expands the scope of the common-domicile rule of subsection (2)(a) to include 
persons who are domiciled in different states that have laws that would produce the same 
outcome.  § 31.875(2)(b).  The operation and rationale of subsection (2)(b) is explained 
infra Part V.B.2. 
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which allows the plaintiff to opt for the law of the state of injury 
under certain conditions discussed later.140 
a.  The Common-Domicile Rule 
The common-domicile rule codifies prevailing judicial practice in 
the United States and reflects similar developments in contemporary 
conflicts law around the world.  Since the abandonment of the lex loci 
delicti rule in the United States, the notion of applying the law of the 
parties’ common domicile to certain torts committed entirely in 
another state has steadily gained ground—so much so that one can 
speak of the emergence of a true common-domicile rule.141  A 
“common-country” rule has also emerged in the rest of the world.  As 
documented elsewhere,142 recent private international law 
codifications and international conventions have adopted the notion of 
applying the law of the country with which both the tortfeasor and the 
victim are affiliated through domicile, habitual residence, or 
nationality.  This notion is implemented either through a common-
domicile rule (as in the Swiss, Quebec, and Puerto Rican 
codifications, and the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Products Liability),143 or through an exception from the lex loci rule.  
The exception is phrased either in common-domicile or common-
habitual residence language (as in the European Union’s Rome II 
Regulation, and the Dutch, German, Hungarian, and Tunisian 
codifications),144 or in common-nationality language (as in the 
Portuguese, Polish, Italian, and Russian codifications).145  Other 
 
140 See infra Part V.B.3.c. 
141 See infra notes 148–53 and accompanying text.  The parameters of this rule are 
discussed later. 
142 See SCOLES, HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 6, at 804–06. 
143 See Bunesgesetz ber das Internationale Privatrecht [Federal Code of Private 
International Law] Dec. 18, 1987, SR 291, art. 133 (Switz.); 64 R.S.Q. 3126 (1991) 
(Can.); Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability, art. 5, Oct. 2, 
1973, 1056 U.N.T.S. 187; see also Symeonides, Revising Puerto Rico’s Conflicts Law, 
supra note 3. 
144 See Rome II, supra note 82, arts. 4(2), 5(1), 6(2) & 9; 2001 Act Regarding the 
Conflict of Laws on Torts of 11 Apr. 2001, stb. 2001, 190 art. 3(3) (Neth.); 
Einführungsgesetz zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuche [EGBGB] (Introductory Act to the Civil 
Code), May 21, 1999, BGBI. I at 1026, art. 40(2) (F.R.G.); Law Decree No. 13 of 1979 on 
International Private Law § 32(3) (Hung.); Tunisian Code of Private International Law, 
No. 98-97 art. 70(3) (1998). 
145 See CÓDIGO CIVIL PORTUGUÊS (PORTUGUESE CIV. CODE) art. 45(2) (as amended in 
1966); Polish Private International Law Act of 1966, art. 31(2); Legge di riforma del 
sistema italiano di dritto internazionale private e processuale of May 31, 1995, Gazz. Uff. 
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codifications contain exceptions which, though not explicitly phrased 
in common-domicile language, are very likely to be employed in 
common-domicile situations.146  Thus, the notion of applying the law 
of the parties’ common affiliation to certain torts seems to enjoy 
universal acceptance today. 
Opinions tend to diverge, however, in (1) compressing this notion 
into a specific rule; (2) demarcating this rule’s boundaries; (3) 
defining the fact-law patterns, issues, and persons that should be 
included within its scope; and (4) articulating its philosophical 
foundations.  By way of example—and moving from the narrowest to 
the broadest formulation—the scope of the common-domicile rule 
could be defined in at least the following five ways, each of which 
reflects different philosophical assumptions and biases in favor of 
either (a) forum law, (b) the law that favors recovery, or (c) both: 
(1) Confine the common-domicile rule to cases in which the 
parties’ common domicile is in the forum state and that state’s law 
is more protective of the victim than the law of the state of conduct 
and injury; 
(2) Phrase the rule in forum-neutral terms, but confine it to cases 
in which the law of the common domicile is more protective of the 
victim than the law of the state of conduct and injury;147 
(3) Phrase the rule in more neutral terms and apply the law of the 
common domicile “for better or worse,” that is, whether or not that 
law favors recovery; 
 
no. 128, art. 62 (Italy); Grazhdanskii Kodeks RF [GK] [Civil Code] art. 1219(2) (Russ.); 
see also Chinese Soc’y of Private Int’l Law, Model Law of Private International Law of 
the People’s Republic of China, art. 114 (2000), in 3 YEARBOOK OF PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 349 (Peter Šarčević & Paul Volken eds., 2001). 
146 This is the case, for example, in the Austrian codification, the English private 
international law statute of 1995, the Hague Traffic Accidents Convention, and some other 
international conventions.  These exceptions are not expressly confined to issues of loss 
distribution.  However, the exceptions are more likely to be very confined in actual 
application because these codifications contain varying admonitions to the effect that, in 
applying another law, the court should “not prejudice” or should “take into consideration” 
the laws of conduct and safety prevailing at the place of conduct.  For citations and further 
discussion, see SCOLES, HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 6, at 805–06. 
147 Consider the following “rule of choice-of-law,” extrapolated by Professor Sedler 
from the judicial applications of interest analysis: “When two parties from a recovery 
state, without regard to forum residence, are involved in an accident in a nonrecovery 
state, recovery will be allowed.”  Robert Allen Sedler, Rules of Choice of Law Versus 
Choice-of-Law Rules: Judicial Method in Conflicts Torts Cases, 44 TENN. L. REV. 975, 
1034 (1977) (emphasis omitted). 
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(4) Extend the rule to cases in which the tortfeasor and the victim 
are domiciled in different states, if these states have the same law 
on the issue; or 
(5) Apply the rule not only to conflicts of “loss-allocating” rules 
but also to conflicts of “conduct-regulating” rules. 
The above-quoted terms are explained below.148  Suffice it to say 
that each of the above iterations of the common-domicile rule has 
garnered support (as well as opposition), and some of these iterations 
have received legislative sanction.149  Under Oregon’s new Act, the 
common-domicile rule: 
(1) is phrased in bilateral, forum-neutral terms; 
(2) is phrased in terms that neither favor nor disfavor recovery.  In 
other words, the law of the common domicile is to be applied “for 
better or worse,” regardless of whether it provides a higher or 
lower standard of financial protection for the tort victim than the 
law of the place of the conduct, injury, or both; 
(3) extends to cases in which the parties are domiciled in different 
states “to the extent that laws of those states on the disputed issues 
would produce the same outcome”;150 
(4) is confined to claims between the “injured person” and the 
“person whose conduct caused the injury” and does not extend to 
claims by or against third parties, such as joint tortfeasors;151 
(5) is subject to the above-noted exception for the conduct-
regulating issue of determining the standard of care by which to 
judge the injurious conduct;152 and 
(6) is subject to a general escape contained in subsection (4) of 
ORS 31.875, which is discussed later.153 
TABLE 3 (below) shows all possible combinations of contacts and 
laws that fall within the scope of the common-domicile rule of 
subsection (2)(a) and its exception.154 
 
148 See infra Part V.B.1.b. 
149 See SYMEONIDES, REVOLUTION, supra note 7, at 157–59. 
150 OR. REV. STAT. § 31.875(2)(b) (2009); see also discussion infra Part V.B.2. 
151 The latter claims are governed by the law selected under ORS 31.880.  See 
discussion infra Part V.D. 
152 See infra Part V.B.2. 
153 See infra Part VI. 
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TABLE 3 
The Common-Domicile Rule of ORS 31.875(2)(a) 
 # P’s Dom. Injury Conduct D’s Dom. 
Pa
tte
rn
 A
 
 
1 A B B A 
2 A B C A 
3 A A B A 
4 A b A A 
5 A B c A 
6 A b C A 
7 A b c A 
8 A b b A 
Pa
tte
rn
 B
 
 
9 A b b A 
10 A b c A 
11 A a B A 
12 A B a A 
13 A B c A 
14 A b C A 
15 A B C A 
16 A B B A 
The sixteen permutations can be divided into two principal 
patterns, Patterns A and B: 
(1) Pattern A encompasses cases in which the state of the common 
domicile has a law that favors recovery.  The first eight cases of 
TABLE 3 fall within this pattern and are arranged in ascending 
order of difficulty; and 
(2) Pattern B encompasses cases in which the law of the common 
domicile prohibits or limits recovery.  Cases 9 through 16 of 
TABLE 3 fall within this pattern and are also arranged in ascending 
order of difficulty. 
Although all sixteen permutations fall within the scope of the 
common-domicile rule, some permutations present relatively easy 
conflicts, while others are functionally equivalent to easy conflicts.  
 
154 The letters in the last four columns represent states that have the contacts shown at 
the top of each column.  A capital letter indicates that the state represented by that letter 
has a pro-recovery law, while a lower-case letter indicates that the state represented by that 
letter has a law that does not favor recovery. 
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For example, Cases 1-2 and 9-10 do not present a real conflict 
because all involved states have either a pro-recovery law (Cases 1 
and 2) or a law that denies or limits recovery (Cases 9 and 10).  
Likewise, Cases 3-4 and 11-12 present relatively easy conflicts 
because the state of the common domicile has the additional contact 
of being the place of either the conduct or the injury.  Cases 5-6 and 
13-14 are functionally similar to the last group because, although the 
common domicile does not have the additional contact, that contact is 
located in a state that has the same law as the common domicile. 
This leaves the last two cases in each pattern, namely, Cases 7-8 
and 15-16 (shown in italics in Table 3), which are cases where the 
conduct and the injury occur in a state or states with a law that is the 
opposite of the law of the common domicile.  Of these cases, the ones 
that are statistically most frequent are those in which the conduct and 
the injury occur in the same state other than the parties’ common 
state, namely, Cases 8 and 16.  Case 8 is the same as the landmark 
New York case Babcock v. Jackson,155 which started the choice-of-
law revolution.  For the sake of simplicity, the following discussion 
focuses on Babcock-type cases (such as Case  8) and their converse 
(such as Case 16). 
In the terminology of interest analysis, which is the main tool and 
language for teaching conflicts law in the United States today,156 a 
Babcock-pattern case presents what is known as the classic “false 
conflict” paradigm.157  Only the state of the common domicile has an 
“interest” in applying its pro-recovery law, while the state of the 
conduct or injury does not have a countervailing interest in applying 
its nonrecovery law.158  Indeed, the state of the common domicile has 
 
155 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963); see also discussion supra note 8. 
156 See Courtland H. Peterson, Restating Conflicts Again: A Cure for Schizophrenia?, 
75 IND. L.J. 549, 559 (2000) (concluding that “the survival of interest analysis as a 
dominant aspect of conflicts theory is a result of the fact that law professors use it to teach 
the subject of conflict of laws—even if they do not personally subscribe to its 
methodology”). 
157 The term “false conflict” was first advanced by the chief architect of interest 
analysis, Professor Brainerd Currie.  False conflicts are those in which only one of the 
involved states has an interest in applying its own law.  In contrast, “true conflicts” are 
those in which both (or more) of the involved states have such an interest.  See CURRIE, 
supra note 10, at 180. 
158 The use of interest analysis terminology in this Article does not imply the adoption 
of interest analysis in this Act or by this author.  For this author’s views on the matter, see 
generally SYMEONIDES, REVOLUTION, supra note 7, at 365–437.  Although coined by 
interest analysts, the terms “false,” “true,” “apparent conflicts,” or “unprovided for cases” 
have also been employed or accepted by proponents of other modern choice-of-law 
 1006 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88, 963 
an interest in ensuring that its domiciliary victim and his or her family 
are compensated by its domiciliary tortfeasor, while the state of the 
conduct and injury does not have a countervailing interest in denying 
recovery to the out-of-state victim and protecting the out-of-state 
defendant.  The overwhelming majority of state supreme courts that 
have encountered such a conflict after the abandonment of the lex loci 
delicti rule have unhesitatingly applied the law of the common 
domicile.  A recent comprehensive study has identified thirty-five 
cases falling within this pattern.  Thirty three of those cases applied 
the law of the common domicile.159  One of the two cases that did not 
do so was subsequently overruled,160 and the other case was factually 
atypical.161 
On the other hand, when the laws of the two states are reversed, as 
in the converse of a Babcock case (Case 16, above), the resulting 
conflict arguably is not as clearly a false conflict.  This is because, 
although the state of the common domicile continues to be as 
interested in allocating losses between its domiciliaries as in the 
Babcock-type case, the state of conduct and injury may also have a 
certain interest in applying its pro-recovery law in order to deter 
wrongful conduct in that state and ensure recovery of medical and 
similar costs incurred in the state of injury.  Nevertheless, most 
American courts encountering this pattern of conflict have applied the 
law of the parties’ common domicile to cases of this pattern.  As the 
same study documents, twenty-six such cases have reached a state 
supreme court in states that have abandoned the lex loci rule.  
Eighteen of those cases applied the pro-defendant law of the common 
domicile, and eight applied the pro-plaintiff law of the state of 
conduct and injury.162  In seven of the latter cases, that state was also 
 
methodologies and provide a common vocabulary in the dialogue among conflicts lawyers 
of any philosophical orientation. 
159 For citations and further discussion, see SCOLES, HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, 
supra note 6, at 799–806; SYMEONIDES, REVOLUTION, supra note 7, at 146–51. 
160 See Dym v. Gordon, 209 N.E.2d 792 (N.Y. 1965). 
161 See Peters v. Peters, 634 P.2d 586 (Haw. 1981).  Peters arose out of a Hawaii traffic 
accident in which a New York domiciliary was injured while riding in a rented car driven 
by her husband.  Id. at 588.  Her suit against her husband (and ultimately his insurer) was 
barred by Hawaii’s interspousal immunity law, but not by New York’s law.  Id. at 588–89.  
The court applied Hawaii law because the insurance policy that had been issued on the 
rental car in Hawaii had been written in contemplation of Hawaii immunity law.  Id. at 
594–95. 
162 See SYMEONIDES, REVOLUTION, supra note 7, at 146–55; Symeon C. Symeonides, 
Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2008: Twenty-Second Annual Survey, 57 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 269, 284–88 (2009) [hereinafter Symeonides, 2008 Survey]. 
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the forum state, and six of those cases were decided under approaches 
that are skewed in favor of forum law—Leflar’s pro-plaintiff “better-
law approach” and Kentucky’s lex fori approach.163 
Be that as it may, based on sheer numbers, one can conclude that 
American courts apply the law of the common domicile to both 
Pattern A and Pattern B cases, not only when that law favors the 
plaintiff, but also when it favors the defendant.  ORS 31.875(2)(a) 
takes the same position.  It calls for the application of the law of the 
common domicile “for better or worse,” regardless of whether that 
law favors the plaintiff (as in Pattern A cases) or the defendant (as in 
Pattern B cases).  Depending on the circumstances, any inequity that 
may result in a particular case falling within Pattern B can be 
addressed through the escape clause of subsection (4) of ORS 31.875, 
which is discussed later.164 
b.  The Exception to the Common-Domicile Rule 
It is important to note, however, that all of the aforementioned 
cases in which American courts have applied the law of the common 
domicile involved conflicts between “loss-allocation” or “loss-
distribution” rules.  In contrast, in cases involving conflicts between 
“conduct-regulating” rules, American courts do not apply the law of 
the common domicile.  Instead, they apply the law of the other state 
or states in which the conduct, injury, or both occurred.165  This 
distinction between the two types of conflicts calls for explanation 
because it provides the dividing line between the common-domicile 
rule of the first sentence of ORS 31.875(2)(a) and its exception stated 
in the second sentence of that subsection. 
The distinction between conduct-regulating and loss-distributing 
rules was first articulated by the New York Court of Appeals in the 
1963 landmark case Babcock v. Jackson.166  Babcock arose out of a 
single-car accident in Ontario, which resulted in injury to a New York 
domiciliary who was a guest-passenger in a car driven by a New York 
host-driver. New York law allowed the passenger to bring a tort 
action against the host-driver, whereas Ontario’s “guest statute” 
immunized the driver and his insurer from suits brought by a 
gratuitous guest-passenger.  The court refused to apply the Ontario 
 
163 For documentation, see id. at 287.  The seventh case was factually atypical.  See id. 
164 See discussion infra notes 290–91 and accompanying text. 
165 See SYMEONIDES, REVOLUTION, supra note 7, at 213–20. 
166 See 191 N.E.2d 279, 284–85 (N.Y. 1963). 
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(loss-distribution) statute and instead applied New York law, allowing 
the action.  However, the court also noted that it would have reached 
a different conclusion “had the issue related to the manner in which 
the defendant had been driving his car at the time of the accident [or 
to] the defendant’s exercise of due care.”167  In such a case, the state 
in which the conduct occurred “will usually have a predominant, if 
not exclusive, concern,”168 and “it would be almost unthinkable to 
seek the applicable rule in the law of some other place.”169  In 
contrast, the issue actually involved in Babcock was 
not whether the defendant offended against a rule of the road 
prescribed by Ontario for motorists generally or whether he violated 
some standard of conduct imposed by that jurisdiction, but rather 
whether the plaintiff, because she was a guest in the defendant’s 
automobile, is barred from recovering damages for a wrong 
concededly committed.170 
Regarding this issue, the court said that the state in which both parties 
were domiciled and their relationship was centered had “the superior 
claim for application of its law.”171 
This distinction between conduct-regulating and loss-distributing 
rules has since been reaffirmed many times by the same court and 
adopted by courts in other states, albeit without always using the same 
terminology and without a consensus on its precise contours.172  The 
Louisiana codification, as well as many European codifications, has 
also adopted a similar distinction.173 
The distinction is traceable to the two fundamental objectives of 
tort law, namely, (1) deterrence and (2) reparation or compensation.  
This duality gives rise to a distinction of tort rules between (1) rules 
designed to primarily deter or regulate conduct by declaring certain 
substandard conduct to be tortious, and (2) rules primarily designed to 
allocate between parties the losses caused by admittedly tortious 
 
167 Id. at 284. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 285. 
172 See SYMEONIDES, REVOLUTION, supra note 7, at 127 n.22.  As one recent study 
concluded, “while not every state has decided the issue, there are no states that have 
rejected [it].” John T. Cross, The Conduct-Regulating Exception in Modern United States 
Choice-of-Law, 36 CREIGHTON L. REV. 425, 441 (2003). 
173 See SYMEONIDES, REVOLUTION, supra note 7, at 127–29. 
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conduct.174  In the words of the New York court, conduct-regulating 
rules are those that “have the prophylactic effect of governing conduct 
to prevent injuries from occurring,”175 while loss-distributing rules 
are those that “prohibit, assign, or limit liability after the tort 
occurs”176 and thus distribute the resulting losses to classes of 
defendants or plaintiffs.  Examples of conduct-regulating rules 
include not only “rules of the road” like speed limits and traffic-light 
rules but also: (1) rules prescribing the civil sanctions for violating 
rules of the road, including presumptions and inferences attached to 
the violation; (2) rules prescribing safety standards for work sites, 
buildings, and other premises; (3) rules imposing punitive damages; 
and (4) rules defining as tortious certain anticompetitive conduct, or 
conduct amounting to “interference with contract,” “interference with 
marriage,” or “alienation of affections.”  Examples of loss-
distributing rules include not only guest statutes, which are now 
virtually extinct, but also rules that prescribe the amount of 
compensatory damages, rules of interspousal immunity, parent-child 
immunity, workers’ compensation immunity, and loss of consortium. 
Admittedly, the line between the two categories is not always very 
bright.  While some tort rules are clearly conduct regulating and some 
are clearly loss distributing, there are many tort rules that do not 
easily fit in either category, and some rules that appear to fit in both 
categories because they may both regulate conduct and affect loss 
distribution.  Nevertheless, when one focuses on the rule’s primary 
function, as New York courts have done,177 most of these difficulties 
are overcome.  In any event, despite difficulties in its application in 
some cases, this distinction provides a useful starting point for 
resolving or analyzing many tort conflicts, although the distinction 
will not make a difference in many other conflicts.  The starting point 
is an assumption that conduct-regulating rules are territorially 
oriented.  Consequently, territorial contacts (namely, the places of 
conduct and injury) remain relevant in conduct-regulation conflicts.  
A state’s policy of deterring substandard conduct is implicated 
whenever such conduct occurs in, or causes injury within, that state’s 
territory, regardless of whether the involved parties are domiciled 
there.  In contrast, loss-distribution rules are not necessarily 
 
174 For the origins and function of this distinction and its use in American conflicts law, 
see id. at 124–40. 
175 Padula v. Lilarn Props. Corp., 644 N.E.2d 1001, 1002 (N.Y. 1994). 
176 Id. at 1003. 
177 See id.; SYMEONIDES, REVOLUTION, supra note 7, at 135–37. 
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territorially oriented.  Consequently, both territorial and personal 
contacts (e.g., the parties’ domiciles) are relevant in loss-distribution 
conflicts.  While a state’s loss-distribution policy may or may not 
extend to nondomiciliaries acting within its territory, the policy does 
extend to state domiciliaries even when they are injured or act outside 
the state. 
This distinction provides a very good basis for delineating the 
scope of the common-domicile rule.  In a common-domicile case 
when the conflict involves only loss-distribution issues, the interests 
of the state of the common domicile are paramount, and its law 
should govern (barring any exceptional circumstances).  This is 
clearly the case in situations falling within Pattern A, above.  Despite 
arguments to the contrary, the same is true in situations like cases 
falling within Pattern B, above.  As one court declared: 
[O]ne incontestably valuable contribution of the choice-of-law 
revolution in the tort conflict field is the line of decisions applying 
common-domicile law . . . . The superiority of the common 
domicile as the source of law governing loss-distribution issues is 
evident.  At its core is the notion of a social contract, whereby a 
resident assents to casting her lot with others in accepting burdens 
as well as benefits of identification with a particular community, 
and ceding to its lawmaking agencies the authority to make 
judgments striking the balance between her private substantive 
interests and competing ones of other members of the 
community.178 
On the other hand, when the conflict in a common-domicile case 
involves only conduct-regulating issues, the policies of the common-
domicile state are usually not implicated, at least not in the same 
degree as those of the state of conduct and injury.  Travelers do not 
carry with them the conduct-regulating rules of their home state.  
Conversely, a state has an interest in enforcing its conduct-regulating 
rules even if neither the violator nor the victim is domiciled in that 
state, and even if both parties are domiciled in the same foreign state.  
A worker injured in State B at a work site operated by his State A 
employer may not be denied the protection of State B’s conduct-
regulating rules, nor may the employer claim exemption from those 
rules.  Although both parties are domiciled in State A, State B has “a 
predominant, if not exclusive, concern,” and “it would be almost 
unthinkable to seek the applicable rule in the law of some other 
 
178 Collins v. Trius, Inc., 663 A.2d 570, 573 (Me. 1995) (citations omitted). 
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place.”179  Indeed as noted earlier, most American courts have not 
applied the law of “some other place,” even that of the common 
domicile.180 
Through the exception from the common-domicile rule, subsection 
(2)(a) of ORS 31.875 allows a similar differentiation between loss-
distribution and conduct-regulation conflicts.  With regard to loss-
distribution issues, the applicable part of subsection (2)(a) is the first 
sentence, which mandates the application of the law of the common 
domicile.  On the other hand, with regard to conduct-regulation 
issues, the second sentence of subsection (2)(a) becomes applicable as 
an exception to the common-domicile rule.  The exception provides 
that “the law of the state in which the injurious conduct occurred 
determines the standard of care by which the conduct is judged”; for 
example, it determines whether the conduct is tortious.181  Thus, if 
under the law of the state of conduct, the actor would be judged not to 
have committed a particular tort, then the actor may not be held liable 
for that tort under the law of the parties’ common domicile.  
Conversely, if, under the law of the state of conduct, the actor would 
be judged to have committed a tort—albeit one for which the actor 
would be immune from suit because of an intrafamily or charitable 
immunity or other similar rule—then the actor may be held liable 
under the law of the parties’ common domicile. 
The above delineation is in line with the practice of American 
courts, which, as noted above, apply the law of the common domicile 
only to loss-distribution conflicts and apply the law of the state of 
conduct and injury to conduct-regulation conflicts.  This delineation is 
also similar to, but more direct than, the distinction drawn by 
European codifications.  These codifications contain provisions 
admonishing courts to “take account” of the “conduct and safety” 
rules of the conduct state when the applicable law is that of another 
state.182  The scope of the concept of “conduct and safety” rules 
varies slightly in the various codifications, but generally it appears 
 
179 Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284 (N.Y. 1963). 
180 See supra Part V.B.1. 
181 The next sentence provides that, if the injury occurred in a state other than the state 
of conduct, the applicable law is determined under ORS 31.875(3)(c), which allows the 
plaintiff to opt for the law of the state of injury under certain conditions discussed later.  
See infra Part V.B.3.c. 
182 See Symeon C. Symeonides, The American Revolution and the European Evolution 
in Choice of Law: Reciprocal Lessons, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1741, 1752–60 (2008) [hereinafter 
Symeonides, Reciprocal Lessons]. 
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narrower than the American concept of conduct-regulating rules.  In 
any event, the major difference is that the European provisions neither 
mandate nor guarantee the application of these rules but rather invite 
their consideration (“taking into account”) for certain limited 
purposes.  As discussed in detail elsewhere, this equivocation creates 
many problems.183  The above-quoted provision of the Oregon Act 
(ORS 31.875(2)(a), second sentence) avoids such problems by 
mandating the application of the law of the state of conduct to judge 
the standard of care.  Of course like all other provisions of ORS 
31.875, this provision is also subject to the general escape provided in 
subsection (4), which is discussed later.184 
2.  Cases in Which the Parties Are Domiciled in States with Laws that 
Would Produce the Same Outcome 
 Subsection (2)(b) of ORS 31.875 deals with situations in which 
the injured person and the person whose conduct caused the injury are 
domiciled in different states that have laws that produce the same 
outcome on the disputed issue or issues.  Cases 17 and 18 in TABLE 2, 
above, which are also reproduced below in TABLE 4, present this 
pattern.  In Case 17, the parties are domiciled in states that have a pro-
recovery law, while, in Case 18, the parties are domiciled in states 
that have a law that denies or places stricter limits on recovery than 
the law of the other involved state or states. 
TABLE 4 
Fictitious Common-Domicile Cases 
# P’s Dom. Injury Conduct D’s Dom. 
17 A --- --- C 
18 A --- --- C 
ORS 31.875(2)(b) brings both of those situations and their 
permutations185 under the scope of the common-domicile rule by 
providing that, in these cases, the parties are to be treated as if they 
 
183 See id. at 1756–62. 
184 See infra notes 290–91 and accompanying text. 
185 The middle columns representing the states or state of conduct and injury are left 
blank because the content of their laws is immaterial for purposes of applying the rule of 
ORS 31.875(2)(b).  If one were to replace the dashes with letters representing all possible 
combinations, it would become apparent that the scope of this rule is as wide as that of the 
common-domicile rule of subsection 2(a).  See TABLE 3, supra p. 1004. 
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were domiciled in the same state “to the extent that” the laws of those 
states would produce the same outcome on the disputed issues.186 
The rationale for this treatment is that these cases are functionally 
analogous to the common-domicile cases and therefore should be 
treated alike.  For example, in a case like Babcock (Case 8 of TABLE 
3, above), if the defendant had been domiciled in New Jersey (rather 
than in New York) and if New Jersey (like New York) did not have a 
guest statute, there would be little argument both that the resulting 
conflict would be as false as Babcock itself, and that it should be 
resolved by allowing the action to proceed.  Similarly, in a case 
converse to Babcock, if the two parties had been domiciled in Ontario 
and Quebec, respectively, and both of these provinces had a guest 
statute prohibiting the action, then the resulting conflict would not 
differ in any material way from Case 16 of TABLE 3, above, and 
should be resolved the same way by not allowing the action to 
proceed.  American courts encountering such conflicts have in fact 
reached the results mandated by ORS 31.875(2)(b).187  This provision 
may prove practically useful in cases involving multiple victims or 
multiple tortfeasors. 
Subsection (2)(b) does not define exactly when the two laws would 
produce “the same outcome,” nor does it designate which of the two 
laws to apply.  Both questions are left to judicial interpretation, but in 
most instances, the questions will resolve themselves.  For example, if 
both domiciliary states have an intrafamily or charitable immunity 
rule prohibiting the action, then on the issue of whether the defendant 
is immune from suit, both states’ laws would produce the same 
outcome and it would make no difference which of the two laws the 
court applies; in either case the plaintiff’s suit will be barred.  If in 
another case, one domiciliary state imposes a $500,000 damages cap 
and the other domiciliary state imposes a $1,000,000 cap, then the 
two laws would produce the same outcome “to the extent” that they 
both disallow unlimited damages and a different outcome “to the 
extent” that they allow different amounts.  The rule of subsection 
(2)(b) would apply on the first issue and prevent unlimited damages 
 
186 For an identical rule, see LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3544(1) (2009); Symeonides, 
Louisiana’s New Law, supra note 3, at 769 (“Persons domiciled in states whose law on the 
particular issue is substantially identical shall be treated as if domiciled in the same 
state.”); see also AM. LAW INST., supra note 36, § 6.01(c)(3) (“Plaintiffs shall be 
considered as sharing a common habitual residence or primary place of business if they are 
located in states whose laws are not in material conflict.”). 
187 See SYMEONIDES, REVOLUTION, supra note 7, at 160–62. 
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(even if the state of conduct, injury, or both, does not limit damages), 
but not on the second issue of the exact amount for which the plaintiff 
will be eligible.  The amount will then depend on which law would be 
applicable to this issue under the other provisions of ORS 31.875. 
One effect of subsection 2(b) is that it will, in some cases, lead to 
the application of a different law than that designated by the 
subsequent provision of ORS 31.875, namely subsections (3)(b) and 
(3)(c).  For example, if both the conduct and the injury occurred in 
State C and the parties were domiciled in States A and B respectively, 
then the case would fall under subsection (3)(b), which calls for the 
application of the law of State C (subject to an exception).188  
However, if the laws of States A and B would produce the same 
outcome, then the court should reach that outcome, rather than the 
outcome produced by the law of State C.  Similarly, if in another 
situation, the conduct occurred in State A and the injury occurred in 
State B and the parties were domiciled in States C and D respectively, 
the case would fall within subsection (3)(c), which calls for the 
application of the law of State A, unless (under certain conditions) the 
injured person opts for the law of State B.189  However, if the laws of 
States C and D would produce the same outcome, then the court 
should reach that outcome, rather than the outcome produced by the 
laws of either State A or State B. 
Finally, like the rest of ORS 31.875, subsection (2)(b) is confined 
to cases in which the injured person and the person whose conduct 
caused the injury are domiciled in states with laws that would produce 
the same outcome.  This provision does not apply to third parties, 
whose claims are governed by ORS 31.880 and then ORS 31.878.  
However, nothing prevents a court applying ORS 31.878 from 
drawing an analogy from the principle of subsection (2)(b) and 
proceeding accordingly. 
3.  Cases in Which the Parties Are Domiciled in States with Laws that 
Would Produce a Different Outcome 
ORS 31.875(3) provides for situations in which, at the time of the 
injury, the injured person and the person whose conduct caused the 
 
188 See Cases 23–26, in TABLE 2, supra pp. 999–1000; TABLE 6, infra p. 1020. 
189 See Cases 27–36, in TABLE 2, supra pp. 999–1000; TABLE 6, infra p. 1020.  It 
should be noted that the two cases discussed here—as well as all other cases that 
subsection (2)(b) brings under the scope of the common-domicile rule of subsection 
(2)(a)—are potentially subject to the exception provided for in the second sentence of 
subsection (2)(a) for determining the applicable standard of care. 
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injury were domiciled in different states, and the laws of those states 
would produce different outcomes.  These situations are portrayed by 
Cases 19 through 36 in TABLE 2, above, and are discussed below. 
a.  Split-Domicile Cases in Which the Conduct and the Injury 
Occurred in One Party’s Home State 
ORS 31.875(3)(a) deals with situations in which both the injurious 
conduct and the resulting injury occurred in the home state of either 
the injured person or the person whose conduct caused the injury.  
Cases 5 through 8 of TABLE 2, above, depict these patterns, which are 
also reproduced in TABLE 5, below, for the reader’s convenience. 
TABLE 5 
Split-Domicile Cases Arising from Torts in Either Party’s Home State 
 # P’s Dom. Injury Conduct D’s Dom. 
Pattern A 
19 A A A b 
20 A B B B 
 
Pattern B 
21 A B B B 
22 A A A B 
In Cases 19 and 22, the conduct and injury occur in the victim’s 
home state, but in Case 19, that state has a law that favors the victim, 
while in Case 22, it has a law that favors the tortfeasor (who is 
domiciled in another state whose law favors the victim).  In Cases 20 
and 21, the conduct and injury occur in the tortfeasor’s home state, 
but in Case 20 that state has a law that favors the tortfeasor, while in 
Case 21 that state has a law that favors the victim (who is domiciled 
in another state with laws favoring the tortfeasor). 
Subsection (3)(a) provides that, in all four of the above cases, the 
applicable law shall be the law of the domiciliary state in which both 
the conduct and the injury occurred, that is, the victim’s home state in 
Cases 19 and 22 and the tortfeasor’s home state in Cases 20 and 
21.190  As explained below, this result is in line with the results 
reached by the majority of courts in other states.191 
Under ORS 31.875(3)(a), the law of the designated domiciliary 
state applies: (1) regardless of whether it favors the domiciliary of 
 
190 For an identical choice-of-law rule, see LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3544(2)(a); 
Symeonides, Louisiana’s New Law, supra note 3, at 726–29. 
191 See SYMEONIDES, REVOLUTION, supra note 7, at 163–91. 
 1016 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88, 963 
that state, plaintiff or defendant (as in Cases 19 and 20), or instead the 
domiciliary of the other involved state, defendant or plaintiff (as in 
Cases 21 and 22); and (2) regardless of whether the case involves 
conflicting conduct-regulating or loss-distributing rules.  If the case 
involves conflicting conduct-regulating rules, then applying the law 
of the state that has both territorial contacts (conduct and injury) is 
most appropriate and entirely uncontroversial.  For reasons stated 
above,192 that state is the only one that has a legitimate claim to apply 
its law, regardless of whether it favors or disfavors recovery.  Even 
Professor Currie, whose analysis attributed such a central role to the 
law of the parties’ domiciles, would probably not dispute this.193 
However, if the case involves conflicting loss-distribution rules, 
then there is at least some difference of opinion regarding which law 
should govern.  For example, Currie and other interest analysts would 
divide the above cases into two patterns: (1) Pattern A cases (19 and 
20), in which the law of the state of conduct and injury favors the 
domiciliary of that state (while the law of the other state favors the 
domiciliary of that state); and (2) Pattern B cases (21 and 22), in 
which the law of each state favors the domiciliary of the other state. 
In interest analysis terminology, Pattern A cases present what is 
known as the “direct” or “true” conflict paradigm.  This 
characterization is based on the assumption that each state would have 
an interest in protecting its own domiciliary.  Currie, the chief 
proponent of interest analysis, concluded that the only solution for 
true conflicts in which (as usual) the forum state is one of the 
interested states is to apply the law of the forum.  His rationale was 
that judges do not have the constitutional power, nor the necessary 
resources, to weigh conflicting state interests and should not be put in 
the position of having to subordinate the forum’s interests.  Currie 
thought that such a weighing is a “political function of a very high 
order . . . that should not be committed to courts in a democracy.”194 
Currie’s rationale was unpersuasive, or at least unrealistic,195 and 
most American courts have rejected it, at least for this pattern of 
cases.  As a recent comprehensive study has documented, courts 
 
192 See supra Part V.B.1.b. 
193 See CURRIE, supra note 10, at 58–61, 69 (distinguishing between “compensatory” 
rules and conduct-regulating rules and recognizing that the latter are territorially oriented). 
194 Id. at 182.  Currie also speaks of the “embarrassment of [a court] having to nullify 
the interests of its own sovereign.”  Id. at 278–79, 357; see also Brainerd Currie, The 
Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 754, 778 (1963). 
195 See SYMEONIDES, REVOLUTION, supra note 7, at 20. 
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applied the law of the forum in only two of the forty-five reported 
cases falling within Pattern A.196  One of the latter cases was decided 
under Kentucky’s lex fori approach,197 and the other under 
Minnesota’s better-law approach.198  Forty-two of the forty-five cases 
reached the precise result mandated by ORS 31.875(3)(a) of the 
Act.199  Of those cases, twelve presented the same subpattern as Case 
19, and thirty cases presented the same subpattern as Case 20.  One of 
the latter cases was an Oregon case, Casey v. Manson Construction & 
Engineering Co.200  In Casey, a Washington defendant acting in 
Washington caused injury in Washington to an Oregon domiciliary.  
The victim’s wife sued the defendant in Oregon for loss of 
consortium, a remedy that was available under Oregon law but 
unavailable under Washington law.  Oregon courts applied 
Washington law, reasoning that Washington defendants 
should not be required to accommodate themselves to the law of the 
state of residence of any traveler whom they might injure in 
Washington; [and] that . . . Washington’s interest in the matter, 
which was protective of Washington defendants, was paramount to 
Oregon’s interest in having its resident recover for her loss.201 
Casey was correctly decided, and ORS 31.875(3)(a) preserves its 
holding and reasoning.  Indeed, as Professor Cavers proposed: 
 Where the liability laws of the state in which the defendant acted 
and caused an injury set a lower standard of . . . financial protection 
than do the laws of the home state of the person suffering the injury, 
 
196 See id. at 163–71. 
197 See Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972) (applying the law of the forum, 
which was also the plaintiff’s domicile, in a case presenting the same pattern as Case 20 of 
TABLE 5). 
198 See Lommen v. City of E. Grand Forks, 522 N.W.2d 148 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) 
(applying the law of the forum—which was also the domicile of the defendant—in a case 
involving the same factual pattern as Case 19 of TABLE 5). 
199 In the remaining case, Harris v. City of Memphis, 119 F. Supp. 2d 893 (E.D. Ark. 
2000), a case involving the same pattern as Case 19 of TABLE 5, the court applied the law 
of the defendant’s home state.  However, the defendant was a state entity and the decision 
was based on comity toward that state rather than choice-of-law reasoning. 
200 247 Or. 274, 428 P.2d 898 (1967). 
201 Erwin v. Thomas, 264 Or. 454, 461, 506 P.2d 494, 497 (1973); see also Casey, 247 
Or. at 294–95, 428 P.2d at 908 (Holman, J., concurring) (“Washington citizens carrying on 
activities in Washington [should not] have to lift their financial protection to an 
unaccustomed level and one which would be dependent upon the locality from which the 
injured party might come.”). 
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the laws of the state of conduct and injury should determine the 
standard of conduct or protection applicable to the case.202 
As Cavers reasoned, “[i]nhabitants of [that state] should not be put in 
jeopardy of liabilities exceeding those [its] law creates simply 
because persons from states with higher standards of financial 
protection choose to visit there.”203 
Similar reasoning applies in the converse case, Case 19 above, in 
which the conduct and the injury both occur in the victim’s home 
state, the law of which protects the victim.  To quote Cavers again, 
“[The] system of physical and financial protection [of the victim’s 
domicile] would be impaired if a person who enters the territory of 
[that] state were not subject to its laws.”204  The domiciliaries of that 
state “should not be put in jeopardy in [that state] simply because [an 
out-of-state resident] . . . had come into [that state] from a state whose 
law provides a lower standard of financial protection.”205  The out-of-
state defendant who is held to the higher standard of the state of 
injury “is not an apt subject for judicial solicitude.  He cannot fairly 
claim to enjoy whatever benefits a state may offer those who enter its 
bounds and at the same time claim exemption from the burdens.”206  
As one case involving this pattern states, “The maxim ‘When in 
Rome do as the Romans do’ bespeaks the common sense view that it 
is the traveler who must adjust.”207 
In Pattern B cases (21 and 22), each state’s law favors the 
domiciliary of the other state.  In interest analysis terminology, these 
cases present an “inverse” conflict known as an “unprovided-for” or 
“no-interest” case on the assumption that neither state would have an 
interest in protecting the domiciliary of the other state.208  Again, 
Currie’s “solution” to this conflict was to apply the law of the forum 
qua forum—even though the forum in such cases is, ex hypothesi, a 
 
202 CAVERS, supra note 31, at 146 (emphasis omitted).  The principle is accompanied 
by an exception for cases in which the parties had a preexisting relationship.  See id. 
203 Id. at 148–49. 
204 Id. at 140. 
205 Id. at 142. 
206 Id. at 141. 
207 Bledsoe v. Crowley, 849 F.2d 639, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Williams, J., concurring). 
208 Of course, the “no-interest” label is problematic because it forejudges the answer to 
the basic question of whether a state actually has an interest in applying its law to the 
particular case—a question that reasonable minds often answer differently.  For this 
reason, it is better to employ the nonprescriptive term “inverse conflicts,” which simply 
indicates objectively that each state’s law favors the party affiliated with the other state. 
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disinterested state.  Currie’s explanation for applying the law of the 
forum was that “no good purpose is to be served by putting the parties 
to the expense and the court to the trouble of ascertaining the foreign 
law.”209  Although this explanation sounds sensible, it overlooks the 
problem grammarians call prothysteron: one cannot know whether the 
case is a “no-interest” case without first knowing whether the foreign 
state is uninterested; and one cannot know whether that state is 
uninterested without first ascertaining the content of its law and 
identifying its underlying policies. 
One of the few cases that adopted Currie’s reasoning was an old 
Oregon case, Erwin v. Thomas,210 which presented the same 
subpattern as Case 22 of TABLE 5, above.  Erwin was an action for 
loss of consortium filed by a Washington woman whose husband was 
injured in Washington by the conduct of an Oregon defendant.211  
Oregon law favored the Washington plaintiff by allowing such an 
action, whereas Washington law favored the Oregon defendant by 
denying the action.212  The court concluded that “neither state ha[d] a 
vital interest in the outcome of this litigation.”213  Washington’s 
defendant-favoring policy was not implicated because this case did 
not involve a Washington defendant, and Oregon’s plaintiff-favoring 
policy also was not implicated because this case did not involve an 
Oregon plaintiff.214  Thus, as Currie said, “[n]either state cares what 
happens,”215 and hence, said the court, “an Oregon court does what 
comes naturally and applies Oregon law.”216 
Most courts have rejected Erwin’s (and Currie’s) rationale,217 and 
so does ORS 31.875(3)(a).  The result mandated by subsection (3)(a) 
may appear intuitively more appropriate when the law of that state 
favors the domiciliary of that state, as in Pattern A cases (19 and 20 of 
 
209 CURRIE, supra note 10, at 156. 
210 264 Or. 454, 506 P.2d 494 (1973). 
211 Id. at 455, 506 P.2d at 494–95. 
212 Id. at 455–56, 506 P.2d at 494. 
213 Id. at 459, 506 P.2d at 496. 
214 See id., 506 P.2d at 496 (“[I]t is stretching the imagination more than a trifle to 
conceive that the Oregon Legislature was concerned about the rights of all the nonresident 
married women in the nation whose husbands would be injured outside of the state of 
Oregon.”). 
215 CURRIE, supra note 10, at 152. 
216 Erwin, 264 Or. at 459–60, 506 P.2d at 496–97.  The court also noted that 
Washington would not object to the application of Oregon law.  See id. at 459, 506 P.2d at 
496. 
217 See SYMEONIDES, REVOLUTION, supra note 7, at 178–91. 
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TABLE 5, above).  However, for reasons of evenhandedness as well as 
other reasons, subsection (3)(a) takes the position that the same result 
is also appropriate even when that law favors the domiciliary of the 
other state, as in Pattern B cases (21 and 22).  When a person is 
injured in her home state by conduct in that state (Cases 19 and 22), 
her rights should be determined by the law of that state, even if the 
person who caused the injury happened to be domiciled in another 
state and regardless of the other state’s law.  The law of the latter state 
should not be interjected to the victim’s detriment or benefit.  By the 
same token, when a person acting within a home state causes injury in 
that state (Cases 20 and 21), the individual should be held accountable 
according to the law of that state, even if the injured person happened 
to be domiciled in another state and regardless of the other state’s 
law.  The law of the latter state should not be interjected to the actor’s 
detriment or benefit. 
b.  Split-Domicile Cases in Which the Conduct and the Injury 
Occurred in the Same Third State 
ORS 31.875(3)(b) deals with situations in which: (1) at the time of 
the injury, the injured person and the person whose conduct caused 
the injury were domiciled in different states with laws that would 
produce a different outcome; and (2) both the injurious conduct and 
the resulting injury occurred in a third state other than the state in 
which either person was domiciled.  Cases 23 through 26 of TABLE 2, 
above, depict these situations. For the reader’s convenience, these 
cases are shown again in TABLE 6, below. 
TABLE 6 
Split-Domicile Cases Arising from Conduct and Injury in a Third 
State 
# P’s Dom. Injury Conduct D’s Dom. 
23 A C C B 
24 a C C B 
25 a C C B 
26 A C C B 
Subsection (3)(b) provides that all such cases are to be governed by 
the law of the state in which both the conduct and the injury occurred.  
This appears to be a return to the traditional lex loci delicti rule, which 
has remained the default rule during and after the choice-of-law 
revolution.  There are, however, two important differences. First, 
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unlike the traditional rule, which mandated the application of the law 
of the state of injury even if the conduct did not occur in that state, the 
rule of subsection (3)(b) requires the occurrence of both the conduct 
and the injury in the same state in order to apply its law.  Second, 
unlike the traditional rule, which was not subject to any direct 
exceptions,218 the rule of subsection (3)(b) is accompanied by a 
specific exception (besides the general escape of subsection (4), 
which is discussed below219).  The exception provides that, if a party 
demonstrates to the court’s satisfaction that the application of the law 
of the state of conduct and injury to a disputed issue will not serve the 
objectives or policies of that law under the circumstances of the 
particular case, then that issue will be governed by the law selected 
under ORS 31.878, while the remaining issues (if any) will be 
governed by the law of the state of conduct and injury. 
This exception is necessary (primarily, but not only) because, in 
some cases, the connections of the state of conduct and injury may be 
transient, fortuitous, or otherwise tenuous.  Suppose, for example, that 
an airplane that was diverted by bad weather from its scheduled route 
over State X crashed in State Y due to pilot error that occurred in the 
airspace of State Y.  Suppose further that State Y, which has no other 
connections with the case, imposes a cap on the amount of 
compensatory damages for wrongful death, while other involved 
states do not impose such a cap.  Depending on other factors and 
circumstances, this case may be a good candidate for the exception if 
the party opposing the application of State Y law demonstrates that 
the objectives State Y seeks to accomplish by imposing a damages 
cap (e.g., to protect defendants domiciled or based in that state) would 
not be served by applying the cap in this case. 
Depending on the circumstances, other cases may not be good 
candidates for this exception, even if the connection of the state of 
conduct and injury are transient or fortuitous.  Suppose, for example, 
that parties domiciled in States A and B, respectively, are involved in 
a two-car traffic accident in State X, and one of the disputed issues is 
whether one of the parties was negligent in driving the car that caused 
the accident.  In the absence of serious countervailing factors, this 
case would not be a good candidate for the exception because that 
 
218 For the various unorthodox “escapes” used by courts that wanted to evade this rule, 
see SYMEONIDES, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 70, at 75–85 (describing the 
misuses of characterization, the substance versus procedure dichotomy, renvoi, and the 
public policy exception). 
219 See infra notes 290–91 and accompanying text. 
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state’s conduct-regulation policies or objectives would be served by 
applying State X’s law for judging what constitutes negligent driving 
within its borders.220 
c.  Split-Domicile Cases Arising from Cross-Border Torts 
ORS 31.875(3)(c) deals with situations in which: (1) at the time of 
the injury, the injured person and the person whose conduct caused 
the injury were domiciled in different states with different laws; and 
(2) the injurious conduct occurred in one state and the resulting injury 
occurred in another state (cross-border torts).  These situations are 
depicted in Cases 27-36 of TABLE 2, above, and are also reproduced 
in TABLE 7, below, for the reader’s convenience. 
TABLE 7 
Cross-Border Torts Between Parties Domiciled in States with 
Different Laws 
 # P’s Dom. Injury Conduct D’s Dom. 
Pa
tte
rn
 A
 
27 a A B B 
28 c A B B 
29 a A B C 
30 d A B C 
31 D A B C 
Pa
tte
rn
 B
 
32 A A B B 
33 A A B C 
34 D A B C 
35 D A B B 
36 d A B C 
Of these cases, Cases 27 and 32 statistically occur the most 
frequently. In those cases, the injured person is domiciled in the state 
of injury and the person whose conduct caused the injury is domiciled 
in the state of conduct.  However, this is not a prerequisite for the 
application of subsection 3(c).  For this reason, TABLE 7 shows all 
 
220 As the two examples illustrate, the exception is more likely to be invoked when the 
disputed issue is one of loss distribution rather than when it is one of conduct regulation.  
However, the court should consider all relevant factors before deciding to apply the 
exception. 
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other cases in which one or both parties are domiciled in other states 
(with different laws).221 
ORS 31.875(3)(c) provides that in all of these cases the applicable 
law is the law of the state of conduct, subject to an exception in favor 
of the law of the state of injury.  The exception applies if two 
requirements are satisfied. 
The first requirement is that the occurrence of the injury in the 
state of injury must have been a foreseeable result of the activities of 
the person whose conduct caused the injury.222  This is an objective, 
rather than a subjective, standard.  Moreover, because ORS 
31.875(3)(c)(A) is a choice-of-law rule rather than a substantive rule, 
the term “foreseeable” should be understood in a “spatial” sense and 
should not be confused with the foreseeability of substantive tort law.  
The pertinent question here is not whether one should have foreseen 
the occurrence of the injury, but rather whether one should have 
foreseen that the injury would occur in the particular state in which 
the injury did occur.  For example, one who operates a factory in 
close proximity to the border with another state should foresee that 
any harmful emissions from the factory may cause injury in the other 
state because the wind may blow in that direction. 
The second requirement is that the injured person must formally 
request, by pleading or amended pleading, the application of the law 
of the state of injury.  If such a request is filed, it shall be deemed to 
encompass all claims and issues against the particular defendant. In 
other words, the injured person may not “pick and choose” the 
favorable and discard the unfavorable parts of the law of the state of 
injury.223 
The idea of allowing one party to choose the applicable law, 
especially after the dispute arises, is new in the United States.  It is 
politically provocative and sounds unilaterally suspicious.  Since the 
beginning of conflicts law history, the choice of the law governing 
multistate cases has been made either: (1) by the law giver in advance 
through preformulated choice-of-law rules, (2) by the judge deciding 
 
221 If the laws of the domicile of the two parties would produce the same outcome, the 
case will be governed by one of those laws under ORS 31.875(2)(b).  See discussion supra 
Part V.B.2. 
222 It is important to note that, unlike subsection (3)(c), the traditional lex loci delicti 
rule, which is still followed in ten states, applies the law of the state of injury without 
regard to whether the occurrence of the injury in that state could have been foreseen. 
223 This provision is designed to prevent a self-serving, inappropriate dépeçage.  For a 
discussion of the concept of dépeçage, see infra Part V.D. 
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the particular case, or (3) through a combination of these two 
methods.  In all cases, the goal was to arrive at an unbiased choice 
made by impartial public actors.  The will of private parties has 
entered the picture only relatively recently.  Over the last two 
centuries, most legal systems have begun resurrecting—and gradually 
employing—the ancient principle of party autonomy, which allows 
parties to a multistate dispute to select the law that will govern the 
dispute.224 
However, this principle has traditionally been limited to the law of 
contracts and has only contemplated a predispute choice agreed to by 
both parties.  If the parties to a contract agreed in advance that a 
particular law would govern their future contractual dispute,225 then a 
court would honor the agreement as long as the agreement was 
otherwise valid and it did not exceed certain public policy limits.  In 
recent years, many systems have extended this principle to certain 
status-like contracts, such as those regulating the property relations of 
spouses (matrimonial regime) and, lately, testate successions law, 
where the testator is now allowed (within certain limits) to designate 
the law that will govern his or her succession.226  In the latter case, 
the choice of law is made by a single party—the testator—who, 
besides being in a different position than either party in adversarial 
litigation, makes the choice before the dispute arises. In contrast, ORS 
31.875(3)(c) gives a postdispute choice to one party who is already an 
actual or potential litigant.  For this reason, one would be justified in 
assuming that such a rule is too generous to that party and, thus, 
unfair to the other party.  However, closer examination militates 
against rushing to such a conclusion. 
First, result-oriented choice-of-law rules—albeit more subtle 
ones—have been around for centuries.  Typically, such rules contain a 
list of alternative references to the laws of several states connected 
with the case (“alternative-reference” rules) and authorize the court to 
select a law that produces the preferred substantive result, such as 
 
224 See supra notes 122–27 and accompanying text. 
225 For the ability of contracting parties to choose the law that will govern future 
noncontractual disputes arising from a contract, see SCOLES, HAY, BORCHERS & 
SYMEONIDES, supra note 6, at 809–12, nn.20–30, 950 n.18; SYMEONIDES, PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 70, at 212–14; Symeonides, Party Autonomy, supra 
note 127. 
226 See SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE END OF THE 
20TH CENTURY: PROGRESS OR REGRESS? 38–40, 56–57 (2000) [hereinafter SYMEONIDES, 
PROGRESS OR REGRESS?]; Symeon C. Symeonides, Result-Selectivism in Conflicts Law, 
46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 10–22 (2009) [hereinafter Symeonides, Result-Selectivism]. 
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favoring the status of marriage, legitimacy, filiation, or adoption.227  
By favoring a particular status, these rules also favor, directly or 
indirectly, the party whose interests depend on the particular status. 
Second, in recent years many systems have extended the notion of 
expressly favoring one party over the other party to maintenance 
obligees, consumers, employees, or other parties whom the legal 
order considers weak or whose interests are considered worthy of 
protection.228  These systems authorize the court to choose the most 
favorable law from among the laws of several states having contacts 
with the case.  For example, Article 18 of the German codification 
allows a choice from among the laws of (1) the obligee’s habitual 
residence, (2) the common nationality of the obligor and the obligee, 
or (3) the law of the forum.  Similar rules in the 1973 Hague 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations, the 
1989 Inter-American Convention on Support Obligations, and several 
national or subnational codifications such as those of Belgium, 
France, Quebec and Tunisia allow similar and sometimes broader 
choices.  The Belgian codification extends the concept of postdispute 
choice by one party to the owner of stolen cultural property or other 
movable property.  Finally, many systems (including those used by 
the European Union, Austria, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Quebec, 
Romania, Russia, Switzerland, and Turkey) protect consumers and 
employees from the adverse consequences of their own potentially 
coerced or uninformed assents to choice-of-law clauses.229  Again, 
the materially desirable result of favoring members of a protected 
class is given preference over considerations of “conflicts justice.”230 
Third, several conflicts codifications either require the court to 
apply the law most favorable to the tort victim, or expressly authorize 
the victim to choose between the laws of the state of conduct and the 
state of injury.  The Portuguese codification of 1966 is an example of 
 
227 See Symeonides, Result-Selectivism, supra note 226, at 10–22. 
228 See id. at 20–22, 25–27. 
229 These systems provide that a choice-of-law clause may not deprive the consumer or 
employee of the protection afforded by the mandatory rules of the country’s law that 
would govern the consumer or employment contract in the absence of such a clause.  Thus, 
a choice-of-law clause can expand but cannot contract the protection available to 
consumers or employees.  See id. at 27. 
230 For the meaning of “conflicts justice” as opposed to “material justice,” see Symeon 
C. Symeonides, Material Justice and Conflicts Justice in Choice of Law, in 
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT OF LAWS FOR THE THIRD MILLENNIUM: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF 
FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER 125 (Patrick J. Borchers & Joachim Zekoll eds., 2001). 
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the former.  Article 45 subjects torts to the law of the place of 
conduct, but also provides that 
[i]f the law of the state of injury holds the actor liable but the law of 
the state where he acts does not, the law of the former state shall 
apply, provided the actor could foresee the occurrence of damage in 
that country as a consequence of his act or omission.231 
The German codification of 1999 gives this choice directly to the tort 
victim.  Article 40(1) of the codification provides in part that tort claims 
are governed by the law of the state of conduct, but “[t]he injured person 
may demand . . . that the law of the state where the result took effect be 
applied instead.”232  Likewise, Article 62 of the Italian codification 
provides in reverse that torts are governed by the law of the state of 
injury, but “the person suffering damage may request the application of 
the law of the State in which the event causing the damage took 
place.”233  Several other countries have adopted this same principle for 
all cross-border torts.  Among them are countries as diverse as China, 
Estonia, Hungary, Korea, Serbia, Slovenia, Tunisia, and Venezuela.234 
Other codifications have adopted this idea only for particular torts.  
For example, the European Union’s Rome II regulation allows such a 
choice only in environmental torts, direct actions against insurers, and 
certain cases involving anticompetitive restrictions; Switzerland does so 
in cases involving emissions, injury to rights of personality, and 
products liability; Belgium does in cases involving defamation and in 
direct actions against insurers; Romania does in cases of defamation, 
unfair competition, and products liability; and Quebec, Russia, Turkey, 
 
231 CÓDIGO CIVIL PORTUGUÊS (PORTUGUESE CIV. CODE) art. 45(2) (as amended in 
1966).  This provision is subject to an exception for some cases in which the parties have 
the same nationality or habitual residence.  An identical provision is contained in Article 
2097 of the New Peruvian Civil Code of 1984, translated in Alejandro M. Garro, 24 I.L.M. 
997, 1011 (1985). 
232 Einführungsgesetz zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuche [EGBGB] (Introductory Act to the 
Civil Code), May 21, 1999, BGBI. I at 1026, art. 40(1) (F.R.G.), translated in Peter Hay, From 
Rule-Orientation to “Approach” in German Conflicts Law: The Effect of the 1986 and 1999 
Codifications, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 633, 650 (1999).  This principle, known as 
Gunstigkeitsprinzip, is traceable to an 1888 decision of the German Reichsgericht.  See 
Decision of 20 November 1888, 23 ENTSCHEIDUNG–EN DES REICHSGERICHTS IN 
ZIVILSACHEN (RGZ) 305 (1888). 
233 Law No. 218 of 31 May 1995 for the Reform of the Italian System of Private 
International Law, Gazz. Uff., Supp. Ord. no. 128, art. 62(1), June 3, 1995 (Italy), translated in 
Andrea Giardina, Italy: Law Reforming the Italian System of Private International Law, 35 
I.L.M. 760, 779 (1996) [hereinafter ITALIAN PIL ACT]. 
234 See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in Cross-Border Torts: Why Plaintiffs Win 
and Should, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 337, 398–403 (2009) [hereinafter Symeonides, Cross-Border 
Torts]. 
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and the Hague Convention do likewise in products liability conflicts.235  
Similar rules have been proposed in the United States for products 
liability.236 
Although at least one of the above codifications conditions the 
application of the law of the state of injury to an express foreseeability 
proviso,237 most codifications fail to include such a proviso.  For 
example, the German, Hungarian, and Tunisian codifications provide for 
the application of the law of the state of conduct, but allow the 
application of the law of the state of injury at the victim’s request—
without conditioning such application on foreseeability.238  The Italian 
and Venezuelan codifications and the Rome II regulation do the reverse 
by applying the law of the injury state unless the victim requests 
application of the law of the state of conduct.239 
The list above of result-oriented rules is a reminder, if one were 
needed, that conflicts law often adopts rules that are directly designed to 
reach a specific substantive result that the system considers preferable.  
The common denominator among the above rules is that they are all 
designed to level the conflicts field between presumptively strong 
parties and presumptively weak parties, such as tort victims or 
maintenance obligees.  Initially, the leveling tool was entrusted only to 
the courts.  In recent years, it has been given directly to the 
presumptively weak parties themselves. 
 
235 See id. at 400–02. 
236 See David F. Cavers, The Proper Law of Producer’s Liability, 26 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 
703, 728–29 (1977) (permitting the plaintiff to choose from among the laws of: (1) the place of 
manufacture; (2) the place of the plaintiff’s habitual residence if that place coincides with 
either the place of injury or the place of the product’s acquisition; or (3) the place of 
acquisition, if that place is also the place of injury); Russell J. Weintraub, Methods for 
Resolving Conflict-of-Laws Problems in Mass Tort Litigation, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 129, 148 
(giving both the victim and the tortfeasor a choice under certain circumstances); Symeon C. 
Symeonides, The Need for a Third Conflicts Restatement (and a Proposal for Tort Conflicts), 
75 IND. L.J. 437, 450–51, 472–74 (2000) (discussing the same notion but different choices). 
237 See CÓDIGO CIVIL PORTUGUÊS (PORTUGUESE CIV. CODE) art. 45(2) (as amended in 
1966). 
238 See EGBGB, arts. 40(1), 44; HUNGARIAN PIL ACT, §§ 32–33; TUNISIAN PIL CODE, art. 
70(2).  The German codification also provides an escape clause, which may enable courts to 
avoid unfair results.  See EGBGB, art. 41. 
239 See ITALIAN PIL ACT, art. 62.1; VENEZUELAN PIL ACT, art. 32 (2); ROME II, supra note 
82, art. 7 (applicable to environmental torts only).  The provisions of the Quebec, Russian, and 
Swiss codifications include a foreseeability proviso but do not condition the application of the 
law of the state of injury on whether that law is favorable to the victim or the tortfeasor.  See 
QUEBEC CIV. CODE, art. 3126(1); Grazhdanskii Kodeks RF [GK] [Civil Code] art. 1219(1) 
(Russ.); SWISS PIL ACT, arts. 133(2), 137, 135, 139, 142(2).  Clearly, the foreseeability 
proviso is needed only when that law is unfavorable to the tortfeasor. 
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ORS 31.875(3)(c) adopts this approach.  Two questions remain to be 
addressed.  First, why give the choice to a party rather than the court?  
The answer is that, in either case, the result would be the same, both 
from the tortfeasor’s and the victim’s perspective.  The only difference 
is from the court’s perspective.  A rule that directly allows a party to 
choose which law governs the claim has distinct practical advantages.  
When the choice is given to the court, the court must determine and 
explain why one state’s law is more favorable than the other state’s law.  
Surprisingly perhaps, this is not always easy, and an erroneous 
determination would be a ground for appeal.  On the other hand, if the 
choice is given to a party, this would obviate the need for a judicial 
answer to the question of whether a given law indeed favors that party.  
This is particularly helpful not only in cases in which that answer is 
unclear, but also in cases in which one state’s law favors one party on 
some issues and the other party on other issues.  The rule of ORS 
31.875(3)(c) avoids the possibility of an inappropriate dépeçage, or 
“picking and choosing.”  The plaintiff will have to carefully weigh all 
the pros and cons of exercising or not exercising the right to choose, and 
if the plaintiff exercises that right, the choice must be for “all claims and 
issues against that defendant.”240  If the choice proves ill-advised, it will 
not be appealable, and the plaintiff will only have himself or herself to 
blame. 
The second question is why give the choice to the victim rather than 
the tortfeasor?  This question can be answered at many levels, ranging 
from the philosophical to the practical, but it is better to begin with 
experience.  How have other states and countries handled cross-border 
torts?  A recent comprehensive study of all cross-border cases decided 
by U.S. state and federal courts in states that have abandoned the 
traditional lex loci delicti rule shows that these courts have reached the 
same results as subsection 3(c) provides.  As the study documents, these 
cases are evenly split between applying the law of the state of conduct 
and the law of the state of injury, but the overwhelming majority of all 
cases nationwide (eighty-six percent) have applied whichever of the two 
laws prescribed a higher standard of conduct for the defendant or of 
financial protection for the plaintiff.241  The courts that decided these 
cases often reached these results after laborious and sometimes 
uncertain analysis.  By adopting the rule of applying the law of the state 
of conduct but also allowing the injured person to opt for the law of the 
 
240 OR. REV. STAT. § 31.875(3)(c)(B) (2009). 
241 See Symeonides, Cross-Border Torts, supra note 234, at 380. 
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state of injury in narrowly defined circumstances, ORS 31.875(3)(c) 
accomplishes the same result but in a much more efficient and cost-
effective way that will provide predictability to prospective litigants and 
help conserve judicial resources. 
In any event, it is important to stress that although ORS 31.875(3)(c) 
may have the effect of favoring plaintiffs, the true reason for giving 
plaintiffs a choice between the laws of the state of conduct and the state 
of injury in this narrow circumstance is to effectuate the policies of those 
states in deterring wrongful conduct, preventing injuries, and providing 
adequate recoveries for those injuries.242  To appreciate this point, it 
may be helpful to distinguish between the two principal patterns of cases 
covered by ORS 31.875(3)(a), namely: 
(1) cases which, under the main rule of subsection 3(c), are 
governed by the law of the state of conduct because the plaintiff 
did not invoke the exception (presumably because that state has a 
pro-plaintiff law).  Cases 27-31 of TABLE 7, above, fall within this 
pattern (hereafter referred to as “Pattern C”); and 
(2) cases governed by the law of the state of injury because the 
plaintiff successfully invoked the exception (apparently because 
the state of injury has a pro-plaintiff law).  Cases 32-36 of TABLE 
7, above, fall within this pattern (hereafter “Pattern D”). 
In Pattern C cases, the conduct state has an undeniable interest in 
applying its pro-plaintiff law in order to police and deter conduct 
occurring within its territory and violating its law, even if the injury 
occurs outside its borders.  Indeed, the effectiveness of this law is 
undermined if it is not applied to out-of-state injuries.  On the other 
hand, the state of injury has no clear interest in applying its pro-
defendant law because that law is designed to protect conduct within, 
not outside, that state.  In other words, the application of the stricter law 
of the conduct state promotes the policy of that state in policing conduct 
within its borders—without subordinating the (nonimplicated) policies 
embodied in the less strict law of the state of injury.243 
 
242 For the role and importance of these policies, see OR. REV. STAT. § 31.878(3)(a) (2009); 
see also discussion infra Part V.C.2.c. 
243 In interest analysis terminology, the classification of this conflict depends both (a) on 
whether the conflict is one between conduct-regulating or loss-distribution issues, and in the 
latter case, (b) on the location of each party’s domicile.  If the case involves a conflict between 
conduct-regulating rules, the case presents the false conflict paradigm for reasons explained in 
the text. If the case involves a conflict between loss-distribution rules, the classification 
depends on where the parties are domiciled.  In the usual case in which the tortfeasor is 
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Moreover, there is nothing unfair in subjecting tortfeasors to the law 
of the state in which they acted because it is a state with which they 
voluntarily associated themselves and which, more often than not, is 
also their home state.  Having violated the standards of that state, 
tortfeasors should bear the consequences of such a violation and should 
not be allowed to invoke the lower standards of another state.  The 
tortfeasor’s conduct “is just as bad when the victim is an outsider as an 
insider,”244 regardless of whether the injury materializes within or 
outside that state.245 
In Pattern D cases, the application of the law of the state of injury 
vindicates that state’s interest in (1) preventing injuries that occurred 
within its territory and were caused by conduct considered unlawful 
there; and (2) protecting or compensating persons injured, and often 
domiciled or hospitalized, there.  The state of conduct also has a 
countervailing interest in protecting conduct occurring within its 
territory and considered lawful there.246  However, under ORS 
31.875(3)(c)(A), the law of the state of injury becomes applicable only if 
 
domiciled in the state of conduct and the victim in the state of injury (Case 27, TABLE 2, supra 
p. 999), the resulting inverse conflict arguably presents the so-called “no interest” paradigm 
because neither state has an interest in applying its law for the benefit of the domiciliary of the 
other state.  In practice, this difference has not had an appreciable bearing on the outcome of 
cases; courts have applied the pro-plaintiff law of the state of conduct at approximately the 
same rate in both categories of cases.  See Symeonides, Cross-Border Torts, supra note 234, at 
353–66. 
244 CAVERS, supra note 30, at 160. 
245 Id. at 160–66.  Professor Cavers advocated for the application of the law of the state of 
conduct to cases of this pattern.  See id. at 159. 
Where the state in which a defendant acted has established special controls, 
including the sanction of civil liability, over conduct of the kind in which the 
defendant was engaged when he caused a foreseeable injury to the plaintiff in 
another state, the plaintiff, though having no relationship to defendant, should be 
accorded the benefit of the special standards of conduct and of financial 
protection in the state of the defendant’s conduct, even though the state of injury 
had imposed no such controls or sanctions. 
Id. 
246 In interest analysis terminology, Pattern B cases present the “true conflict” paradigm, 
regardless of whether the conflict is between conduct-regulating or loss-distributing rules.  In 
conduct-regulation conflicts, each of the two states have the interests stated in the text. In loss-
distribution conflicts, the conduct state has an interest in protecting conduct that is legal within 
its territory, and the second state has an interest in ensuring reparation for injuries it considers 
tortious.  Additionally, however, each state arguably has an interest in protecting the parties 
affiliated with it.  The first state has an interest in protecting a tortfeasor acting (and usually 
domiciled) within its territory, and the second state has an interest in protecting victims injured 
(and often domiciled or hospitalized) within its territory.  Most American cases involving this 
pattern have applied the pro-plaintiff law of the state of injury.  See Symeonides, Cross-Border 
Torts, supra note 234, at 366–79. 
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the tortfeasors activities “were such as to make foreseeable the 
occurrence of the injury in that state.”247  Because of this foreseeability 
proviso, the application of the law of the state of injury is not only 
constitutionally permissible, but also appropriate from the choice-of-law 
perspective.  It is a factor of sufficient weight to tip the scales in favor of 
applying the law of the state that will likely experience the impact of the 
injurious conduct and a good response to any argument of unfair 
surprise by the defendant.  To quote Cavers, once again: 
 Th[e] system of physical and financial protection [of the state of 
injury] would be impaired . . . . if actions outside the state but 
having foreseeable effects within it were not also subject to its law.  
. . . [T]he fact that [the defendant] would be held to a lower standard 
. . . back in the state where he had his home (or in the state where he 
acted) or, indeed, the fact that he enjoyed an immunity there, all 
would ordinarily seem matters of little consequence to the state of 
the injury. 
 . . . . 
. . . If he has not entered the state but has caused harm within it by 
his act outside it, then, save perhaps where the physical or legal 
consequences of his action were not foreseeable, it is equally fair to 
hold him to the standards of the state into which he sent whatever 
harmful agent, animal, object, or message caused the injury.248 
In conclusion, ORS 31.875(3)(c) resolves these difficult conflicts in a 
way that is not only in line with the current American case law but also 
serves the implicated policies of the involved states, without unfairly 
surprising defendants.  It is true this provision has the effect of 
benefiting plaintiffs, even if that effect is coincidental.  However, it is 
important to stress than none of the other provisions of ORS 31.875, or 
of the Act as a whole, have this effect.  A perusal of TABLE 2, above, 
confirms this point.  Of the twenty-six patterns falling within the scope 
of ORS 31.875 subsections (2), (3)(a), and (3)(b), thirteen patterns will 
be governed by a law that favors the tort victim (indicated by shading 
 
247 § 31.875(3)(c)(A). 
248 CAVERS, supra note 31, at 140–41.  Cavers also argued that the same rationale applies 
even if the victim is not domiciled in the state of injury, but rather is domiciled in a state that 
has a lower standard of financial protection than the state of injury.  See id. at 144. 
[T]he financial protection a state has prescribed, being a part of its provision for 
the general security, is in part a sanction for wrongfully causing harm.  As a 
consequence its purposes include elements of deterrence and retribution even 
though it may be couched in essentially compensatory terms.  When the laws of 
the state of injury are viewed in this light, the restrictive laws of the plaintiff’s 
home state tend to fade into irrelevance. 
Id. 
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and capital letters) and thirteen patterns will be governed by a law that 
favors the tortfeasor (indicated by shading and lower-case letters).249  
Secondly, tort conflicts by definition involve conflicting value 
judgments of at least two states as to who should bear the social and 
economic losses caused by injurious conduct that at least one state 
considers tortious.  In the final analysis, of the two parties involved in 
the conflict, the tortfeasor is the one who is likely to be in a better 
position to prevent the loss. 
C.  The General Approach of ORS 31.878 
ORS 31.878 sets forth the Act’s general choice-of-law approach for 
noncontractual claims.  This approach applies “except as otherwise 
provided”250 in ORS 31.865 through 31.875, which prescribe specific 
rules derived from this approach, as well as ORS 31.885, which 
provides for situations in which the parties have validly agreed on the 
governing law.251 
The opening paragraph of ORS 31.878 sets forth the goal or objective 
of the choice-of-law process for noncontractual claims, while the 
remainder of the section prescribes the process or method for achieving 
that goal and the factors one should consider in reaching that goal. 
1.  The Goal and the Catchphrase 
The goal is to identify and apply the law of the state with contacts 
with the parties and the dispute and with policies regarding the disputed 
issues252 that make application of its law the “most appropriate” for 
those issues.253  The phrase “most appropriate” law, which is also used 
in the corresponding provision of the choice-of-law statute for contract 
 
249 See TABLE 2, supra pp. 999–1000. 
250 § 31.878. 
251 Although the rules of ORS 31.872 and 31.875 have been derived from the general 
approach of ORS 31.878, these rules prevail over ORS 31.878 because they are more specific 
on the subjects they cover.  However, as with any a priori rules, the rules of ORS 31.872 and 
31.875 may, in exceptional cases, produce a result that is incompatible with the general 
objective of ORS 31.878.  In order to avoid such a result, ORS 31.872(3) and 31.875(4) each 
provide an “escape clause” that is anchored in ORS 31.878.  Moreover, ORS 31.872—and, to 
a lesser extent, ORS 31.875—do not cover the entire spectrum of cases or issues that might fall 
under the general headings of these sections.  The remaining cases or issues are governed by 
ORS 31.878 as the residual section.  Thus, ORS 31.878 is intended to perform a general as 
well as a residual role. 
252 For the importance of the use of the word “issues” and the requirement for issue-by-
issue analysis, see discussion infra Part V.D. 
253 § 31.878. 
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conflicts,254 is likely to become a catchphrase by which commentators 
will describe this Act—without necessarily paying attention to the 
specifics that follow the phrase.  Some authors may be tempted to draw 
comparisons with acoustically similar phrases, such as Professor 
Morris’s “proper law” concept,255 and at least one author has described 
the identical phrase in the contract statute as signaling a tilt toward 
“material justice.”256 
For reasons explained elsewhere, that description is inaccurate with 
regard to the contracts statute.257  It would be equally inaccurate with 
regard to this Act.  As in the contracts statute, the quoted phrase was 
chosen precisely because it is ideologically neutral and because it is 
different than comparable catchphrases used by other codifications and 
methodologies, including: Professor Currie’s interest analysis, Leflar’s 
better-law approach and other “material justice” approaches, a 
significant-contacts approach, or a significant-relationship approach like 
that of the second Restatement.  The approach of this Act is intended to 
be—and is—different and independent from the above approaches, 
especially the “material justice” approaches.  What makes application of 
a state’s law “most appropriate” under ORS 31.878 (and the Act as a 
whole) is not the perceived material justness or goodness of that law but 
rather that state’s “contacts with the parties and the dispute and [its] 
policies on the disputed issues.”258  To use Gerhard Kegel’s terms, the 
goal of the choice-of-law process under the Act is to find “the spatially 
best solution” (“conflicts justice”), rather than “the materially best 
solution.”259 
 
254 See OR. REV. STAT. § 81.130 (2009). 
255 See J.H.C. Morris, The Proper Law of a Tort, 64 HARV. L. REV. 881 (1951). 
256 See Nafziger, supra note 43, at 400–03 (contending that ORS 81.130 is designed to 
attain “several stipulated objectives of material justice” and describing the Oregon contracts 
statute as “a comprehensive framework of rules for determining the appropriate law, as a 
matter of material justice”). 
257 See Symeonides, Oregon’s Choice-of-Law Codification for Contract Conflicts, supra 
note 12, at 236–37. 
258 § 31.878. 
259 Gerhard Kegel, Paternal Home and Dream Home: Traditional Conflict of Laws and the 
American Reformers, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 615, 616–17 (1979) (emphasis omitted).  The only 
provision of the Act that could be described as containing a tilt toward material justice is ORS 
31.875(3)(c), which has the effect of favoring the plaintiff in some cross-border torts.  
However, for reasons explained earlier, the rationale for that provision is grounded in conflict 
justice rather than material justice.  See supra note 230 and accompanying text. 
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2.  The Process 
The balance of ORS 31.878 prescribes the process or method for 
achieving the goal set forth in the opening paragraph.  This process 
consists of three steps: (1) identifying the states that have relevant 
contacts, (2) identifying the relevant policies of those states, and (3) 
evaluating the strength and pertinence of those policies.  These steps are 
described below. 
a.  Identifying the Involved States 
The first step of the process is to identify the involved states—in 
addition to the forum state, which is ex hypothesi involved—by 
examining their relevant contacts with the parties and the facts that gave 
rise to the dispute.  ORS 31.878(1) lists some of the contacts that are 
usually relevant in conflicts involving noncontractual claims: the place 
of the injurious conduct, the place of the resulting injury, the domicile, 
the habitual residence or pertinent place of business of each person, and 
the place in which the relationship (if any) between the parties was 
centered.  This list of contacts is neither exhaustive nor hierarchical.  
Depending on the circumstances, other contacts may also be relevant.  
Moreover, not all the listed contacts will be relevant in all cases.  
Finally, the listing of these contacts should not be taken as an invitation 
for a mechanistic counting of contacts as a means of choosing the 
applicable law.  That one state has more contacts than other states does 
not necessarily mean that its law should be applied to any or all disputed 
issues.  Those contacts must be the kind that bring into play that state’s 
policies that will make application of that law the “most appropriate” in 
light of the other policies and factors listed in ORS 31.878. 
The reference to the parties’ domiciles or habitual residences in 
subsection (1) is not accompanied by any specific time designation.  
This means that although a party’s domicile at the time of the injury 
remains the most relevant domicile, the court is free to also take into 
account a party’s domicile at the time of the choice-of-law decision, if 
this factor is relevant in “evaluating the strength and pertinence”260 of 
the policies of the involved states.  For example, a postinjury change of 
domicile by the injured person may reduce the pertinence of the 
compensatory policies of the state of the former domicile and bring into 
 
260 § 31.878(3). 
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play the corresponding policies of the state of the new domicile.261  
Likewise, a postinjury change of domicile by a tortfeasor may reduce 
the pertinence of the policies of the tortfeasor’s previous domicile in 
deterring or protecting tortfeasors and bring into play the corresponding 
policies of the new domicile.  Consequently, in selecting the applicable 
law in cases decided under ORS 31.878—or in deciding whether to 
employ the escape clauses found in ORS 31.872(3) and 31.875(3), both 
of which are anchored in ORS 31.878—the court is free to take into 
account a party’s domicile at both the time of the injury and the time of 
the choice-of-law decision. 
According to ORS 31.865(2), the domicile of a legal person is located 
in the state in which the person maintains its principal place of business.  
However, if the dispute arises from activities directed from another state 
in which the legal person maintains a place of business, then either state 
may be deemed as the domicile at the choice of the opposing party.  In 
addition, under ORS 31.878(1), a “pertinent place of business”262 
(pertinent to the disputed issues) of a legal person—or, for that matter, a 
natural person—may be a relative contact in appropriate circumstances. 
b.  Identifying the Pertinent Policies of the Involved States 
The second step of the process is to identify the substantive rule or 
rules of each involved state that appear to be in material conflict with the 
corresponding rule or rules of another involved state, and then identify 
the policies embodied in those rules.  As used in this context, “policy” 
means the objective or telos the state seeks to accomplish by adopting or 
continuing to follow the particular rule.263  If the particular rule is a 
statutory rule, its policy is identified through the same process of 
statutory interpretation used in nonconflicts cases.  If the rule is 
judicially created, its policy is identified in the same way one identifies 
the policy of any common law rule. 
c.  Evaluating the Conflicting Policies 
The third step of the process is to evaluate the relative “strength and 
pertinence” of the conflicting policies of the involved states in light of, 
 
261 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) (finding that the plaintiff’s 
postaccident, good faith acquisition of a new domicile in Minnesota was a factor implicating 
that state’s interest in protecting the plaintiff). 
262 § 31.878(1). 
263 See SYMEONIDES, REVOLUTION, supra note 7, at 396–98 (discussing the teleological 
method of interpretation in conflicts cases). 
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and “with due regard to,”264 two sets of policies listed in ORS 31.878(3) 
subsections (a) and (b)—in order to select the law that is “the most 
appropriate” to apply to the disputed issues.  What is to be evaluated is 
not the wisdom or soundness of a state policy—either in the abstract or 
in comparison with the policy of another state—but rather the “strength 
and pertinence” of the policy at the multistate level.  A legislative policy 
that a state strongly espouses for intrastate cases may in fact be 
attenuated in a particular multistate case that has only minimal contacts 
with that state.  Similarly, the same policy may prove far less pertinent 
even though the case has sufficient contacts with that state if the contacts 
are not of the type that actually implicate that policy. 
The first set of policies used to evaluate the strength and pertinence of 
the conflicting state policies are the general policies of the law of torts 
and noncontractual claims.  These policies are phrased in a general way: 
“encouraging responsible conduct, deterring injurious conduct, and 
providing adequate remedies for the conduct.”265  The court or other 
decision maker is to assess the extent to which the choice of law 
accomplishes or retards these general policies. 
The second set of policies is multistate policies derived from 
Oregon’s membership in the interstate and international community.  In 
making the choice of law, the decision maker should always keep in 
mind the “needs and policies of the interstate and international systems,” 
including the policy of “minimizing adverse effects on strongly held 
policies of other states.”266  The quoted phrases go beyond the self-
evident and unavoidable requirement of complying with the minimal 
limits prescribed by the U.S. Constitution for state choice-of-law 
decisions.267  In some instances, what may be constitutionally 
permissible may not necessarily be appropriate from the choice-of-law 
perspective. Courts should strive for decisions that not only stay within 
the limits prescribed by the Constitution, but also remain deferential and 
sensitive to the needs and policies of the interstate and international 
 
264 § 31.878(3). 
265 § 31.878(3)(a). 
266 § 31.878(3)(b). 
267 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981).  For a general discussion of these 
limits, see MCDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 70, at 189–216; WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS & 
WILLIAM M. RICHMAN, THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (2005); SCOLES, HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra 
note 6, at 149–76; SYMEONIDES, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 70, at 46–61; 
WEINTRAUB, supra note 70, at 511–72. 
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systems.268  In summary, the court or other decision maker should (1) 
always be mindful of the adverse consequences of the choice-of-law 
decision on the strongly held policies of the involved states; and (2) 
choose the law of the state which, in light of its relationship to the 
parties and the dispute and its policies rendered pertinent by that 
relationship, would sustain the most serious legal, social, economic, and 
other consequences of the choice-of-law decision.269 
d.  Policies and “Interests” 
In general terms, a state may be said to have an “interest” in seeing 
that the policies and values embodied in its law are observed—or at least 
not disregarded—in cases that fall within the intended reach of that 
law.270  Nevertheless, ORS 31.878 and the Act avoid using the term 
“interest” in order to disassociate the approach of this section and this 
Act from Professor Currie’s “governmental interest analysis” and other 
modern American approaches that seem to perceive the choice-of-law 
problem as a problem of interstate competition, rather than as a problem 
of interstate cooperation in conflict avoidance.  Instead, ORS 31.878 
calls for a focus on the adverse consequences of the choice-of-law 
decision on the policies of the involved states.271  By definition, 
conflicts cases involve situations that either fall or appear to fall within 
the reach of the laws of more than one state, and the choice-of-law 
process is called upon to resolve these conflicts of overlapping reach.  
Inevitably, when the overlap is real, the choice of one state’s law will 
have some adverse effect on the policies of the other state.  Even so, the 
choice-of-law process under ORS 31.878 should aspire to resolve the 
conflict in a way that causes the least adverse consequences to the 
policies of the involved states. 
 
268 See SYMEONIDES, REVOLUTION, supra note 7, at 373 (“To paraphrase John Donne, no 
state is an island, even if geographically it is.  The selfish pursuit of the forum’s interests is 
inimical to individual justice and state coexistence, as well as detrimental to the forum’s own 
interests in the long run.”). 
269 For consequentialism- and consequences-based choice-of-law approaches, see id. at 30–
31, 116–19, 382–84. 
270 See id. at 370–73. 
271 See id. at 372–73 (“[T]he policies, purposes, and values embodied in a state’s law can 
be adversely affected when that law is not applied to a case that law was intended to reach.  In 
this sense, speaking of a state’s ‘interest’ in applying its law is simply a shorthand way of 
describing this adverse consequence.  Whether one calls this an ‘interest’ or a ‘concern’ . . . is 
really a secondary matter.  The bottom line is that states are not indifferent to the resolution of 
conflicts between their respective laws.  Consequently, a choice-of-law analysis that fails to 
take this factor into account is presumptively deficient.” (footnote omitted)). 
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D.  Issue-by-Issue Analysis and Dépeçage 
The goal of the choice-of-law process under section 9 is to identify 
and apply the law that is most appropriate with regard to the “disputed 
issues.”272  The word “issue” or “issues” is used repeatedly in ORS 
31.878 and throughout the Act.273  This use is intended to focus the 
choice-of-law-process on the particular issue as to which there exists an 
actual conflict of law. 
This “issue-by-issue analysis” is a common feature of all modern 
choice-of-law methodologies that emerged from the revolution.274  
Unlike the traditional method, which selected the applicable law for the 
entire cause of action, modern approaches have narrowed the choice-of-
law inquiry to the various issues that make up a cause of action.  This 
mode of analysis is based on the elementary realization that, in many 
situations, the involved states may have closer connections with a 
case—or be interested in different aspects of it.  Often, the conflict 
remains confined to only certain aspects or “issues” of the case.  
Consequently, rather than seeking to choose a law as if all aspects of the 
case were in dispute, one should focus on the narrow issues with regard 
to which a conflict exists.  When a conflict exists with regard to only 
one issue, the court should focus on the factual contacts and policies that 
are pertinent to that issue.  When a conflict exists with regard to more 
than one issue, each issue is to be analyzed separately because each 
issue may implicate different states or bring into play different policies 
of those states.  Seen from another angle, each state having relevant 
contacts with a given multistate case may not be equally concerned with 
regulating all issues in the case, but may only be concerned with those 
issues that actually implicate its policies in a significant way. 
One possible result of this analysis is that, in some cases, the laws of 
different states will govern different issues in the same cause of action.  
This phenomenon is known in conflicts literature by its French name of 
dépeçage.275  Although infrequently referred to by this name, this 
phenomenon is now a common occurrence in the United States.276  
 
272 OR. REV. STAT. § 31.878, (2) (2009). 
273 See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 31.862, 31.865(1)(c), 31.872(3)–(4), 31.875(2)(b), (3)(b), 
(3)(c)(B), (4), 31.878, (2), 31.880, 31.885 (2009). 
274 See SYMEONIDES, REVOLUTION, supra note 7, at 102–03. 
275 See id. at 103. 
276 See id.  For a discussion of issue-by-issue analysis and dépeçage in European 
codifications, see Symeonides, Reciprocal Lessons, supra note 182, at 1782–84. 
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“[D]épeçage is, per se, neither good nor bad.”277  It is not an end in 
itself, nor is it something that should be avoided at any cost.  Rather, it is 
a recognition of the reality that, in some cases, the states involved in the 
case may be interested in different aspects of it, or at least interested in 
varying degrees.  However in some cases, the use of the law of two 
different states for different issues in the same cause of action may 
defeat the policies of both states.  “In such cases, dépeçage is 
inappropriate and must be avoided.”278 
Issue-by-issue analysis is the proper mode of analysis under this Act.  
Moreover, it is the required mode of analysis for: (1) all cases that fall 
directly within the scope of ORS 31.878; (2) claims and counter-claims 
of third parties or between joint tortfeasors, which are exempted from 
the scope of ORS 31.870 through 31.875 and which ORS 31.880 
relegates to ORS 31.878; (3) issues for which a party invokes the 
escapes of ORS 31.872(3), 31.875(3)(b), and 31.875(4); (4) all other 
cases in which the applicable provision of the Act uses the term issue or 
issues in the sense described here;279 and (5) cases falling under ORS 
31.875(2)(a), which requires separation of the issue of the “standard of 
care” from the other issues in the case.280 
The latter situation is the only one in which the Act requires a 
dépeçage between the “standard of care” and the other issues of the 
case.  Even in that case, however, dépeçage can be avoided if the 
circumstances are such as to justify applying the escape found in ORS 
31.875(4).  In contrast, in two other situations, the Act prohibits 
dépeçage.  The first situation includes all actions that are governed by 
Oregon law under ORS 31.870 with regard to claims between the 
plaintiff and the defendant.281  The second situation occurs in cases 
involving cross-border torts in which the injured party requests the 
application of the law of the state of injury under ORS 31.875(3)(c)(B).  
 
277 SYMEONIDES, REVOLUTION, supra note 7, at 105. 
278 Id.  For the criteria for distinguishing permissible from inappropriate dépeçage, see 
SYMEON SYMEONIDES, WENDY COLLINS PERDUE & ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN, CONFLICT OF 
LAWS: AMERICAN, COMPARATIVE, INTERNATIONAL: CASES AND MATERIALS 260–61 (2d ed. 
2003). 
279 See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 31.862, 31.865(1)(c), 31.872(4), 31.875(2)(b), & 31.885. 
280 See discussion supra Part V.B.1. 
281 However, as noted earlier, ORS 31.870 does not encompass claims and counterclaims of 
third parties or between joint tortfeasors, and ORS 31.880 relegates these claims to ORS 
31.878.  Thus, dépeçage is possible in these cases if the court applies non-Oregon law to the 
latter claims. 
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In such a case, the request “shall be deemed to encompass all claims and 
issues” against that defendant.282 
In all other cases mentioned above, the Act allows dépeçage.  In most 
of these cases, dépeçage will be appropriate or innocuous.  For example, 
when a choice-of-law agreement meeting the requirements of ORS 
31.885 covers only some but not all issues in dispute, the court must 
subject the remaining issues to the law designated by the pertinent 
provisions of the Act, even if it is a law other than the one designated in 
the agreement.  Likewise, it may be entirely appropriate to apply the law 
of one state to claims between the tortfeasor and the victim under ORS 
31.870, 31.872, or 31.875, and the law of another state to claims by or 
against third parties or between joint tortfeasors under ORS 31.878 and 
31.880.  Finally, it may be equally appropriate to apply the law of one 
state to some issues under ORS 21.872 or 31.875 but the law of another 
state to certain issues under the exceptions contained in ORS 31.872(3), 
31.875(3)(b), and 31.875(4).  If dépeçage is inappropriate in the 
particular cases or issue because it defeats the policy of both states, then 
the court can avoid it by exercising the discretion allowed by the above 
provisions. 
VI 
ESCAPE CLAUSES AND THE BALANCE BETWEEN CERTAINTY AND 
FLEXIBILITY 
The tension between the need for legal certainty and predictability, on 
the one hand, and the desire for flexible, equitable, individualized 
solutions on the other is as old as law itself.  Aristotle described it more 
than twenty-three centuries ago when he spoke of the role of equity as a 
corrective of the written law.283  As René David put it, “There is and 
will always be in all countries, a contradiction between two 
requirements of justice: the law must be certain and predictable on one 
 
282 OR. REV. STAT. § 31.875(3)(c)(B) (2009); see also discussion supra Part V.B.3.b. 
283 See ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS V. x 4–7. 
[T]he law always speaks in general terms, yet in many cases it is impossible to 
speak in terms that are both general and correct at the same time. . . . [W]hen the 
law enunciates a general rule and thereafter a case arises that is not covered by 
the general rule, then it is proper, where the law-maker’s pronouncement is 
defective because of its over-simplicity, to rectify the defect by deciding the case 
in the same way as the lawmaker would have decided . . . had he been cognizant 
of the case. . . . This is in essence the nature of equity (epieikia): a corrective of 
the law when the law is defective due to its generality. 
Id. (as translated by the author of this Article). 
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hand, it must be flexible and adaptable to circumstances on the 
other.”284 
The law of conflict of laws is not immune from this contradiction, 
and perhaps it is particularly susceptible to it.  Every legal system has 
wrestled with this contradiction and has striven to attain an appropriate 
equilibrium between these two competing—yet necessary—goals.  
Naturally, the equilibrium differs not only from system to system, but 
also from subject to subject and from time to time.  As noted above, 
American conflicts law (and with it Oregon conflicts law) has moved 
from one extreme of total certainty to the exclusion of flexibility 
(represented by the first Conflicts Restatement) to the other extreme of 
total flexibility and no certainty, represented by the choice-of-law 
revolution. 
This Act restores an appropriate equilibrium between certainty and 
flexibility.  The provisions of the Act discussed in this Article restore 
legal certainty by designating the applicable law to claims and issues 
falling within the scope of those provisions.  This certainty is what has 
been missing—at least since the 1960s, when Oregon abandoned the lex 
loci delicti rule. 
At the same time, however, the Act avoids the mistake of moving to 
the other extreme of total certainty.  Instead, the Act provides a good 
measure of flexibility through two principal means: 
(1) By subjecting to the flexible approach of ORS 31.878 all 
claims for which the other sections of the Act do not designate the 
applicable law—such as claims by or against third parties or 
between joint tortfeasors in all cases285—and all claims in certain 
products liability cases that lack the necessary contacts for the 
application of Oregon law under ORS 31.872;286 and 
(2) By providing in ORS 31.872 and 31.875 three escapes that are 
anchored in ORS 31.878.  These exceptions are discussed below. 
The first exception applies to products liability cases governed by 
Oregon law under ORS 31.872.  ORS 31.872(3) provides that, “[i]f a 
party demonstrates that the application of the law of a state other than 
Oregon to a disputed issue is substantially more appropriate under the 
 
284 RENÉ DAVID, ENGLISH LAW AND FRENCH LAW: A COMPARISON IN SUBSTANCE 24 
(1980). 
285 See § 31.880. 
286 See § 31.872(4). 
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principles of ORS 31.878 . . . , that issue shall be governed by the law of 
the other state.”287 
The second and third exceptions apply to nonproducts liability cases 
that fall within the general rules of ORS 31.875.  One of these rules is 
the first sentence of subsection (3)(b), which provides that cases in 
which the tortfeasor and the victim are domiciled in different states that 
have different laws and in which both the conduct and injury occurred in 
the same third state are governed by the law of that state.288  The second 
sentence of subsection (3)(b) provides an escape for cases in which the 
application of that law to a disputed issue “will not serve the objectives 
of that law.”289  In such a case, that issue will be governed by the law 
selected under the flexible approach of ORS 31.878. 
The third and final escape is found in ORS 31.875(4).  Unlike the 
previous escape, this escape qualifies all the previous rules of ORS 
31.875.290  The escape provides that, if a party demonstrates that the 
application to a “disputed issue” of the law of a state other than the state 
designated by those other rules is “substantially more appropriate under 
the principles of ORS 31.878,” then that issue will be governed by the 
law of the other state.291 
All three escapes operate on an issue-by-issue basis, and all three are 
tied to the general approach of ORS 31.878, as they should be, because 
ORS 31.878 contains the general approach from which the rules of the 
other sections have been derived.  As noted earlier, ORS 31.878 directs 
the decision maker to apply the law of the state with contacts with the 
case and the parties and with policies on the disputed issues that make 
application of its law “the most appropriate” for those issues.  ORS 
31.878 then lists the general principles and factors for identifying the 
“most appropriate” law.  Relying on the same general principles, ORS 
31.872 and 31.875 designate in advance the “most appropriate” law in 
certain categories of cases.  In so doing, these two sections will provide 
prospective litigants with a measure of predictability and will unburden 
courts or other decision makers from the laborious analysis ORS 31.878 
requires. 
 
287 § 31.872(3).  ORS 31.872(2) also contains a more particularized escape for cases in 
which the defendant demonstrates that “the use in Oregon of the product that caused the injury 
could not have been foreseen and that none of defendant’s products of the same type were 
available in Oregon in the ordinary course of trade at the time of the injury.”  § 31.872(2). 
288 See Cases 23–26 in TABLE 2, supra p. 999; Cases 23–26 in TABLE 6, supra p. 1020. 
289 § 31.875(3)(b). 
290 See Cases 1–36 in TABLE 2, supra pp. 999–1000. 
291 § 31.878(4). 
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However, as with any a priori choice-of-law rules, the rules of ORS 
31.872 and 31.875 may, in exceptional cases, produce a result that is 
incompatible with the principles of ORS 31.878, or “substantially less 
appropriate” than the result produced by the law that would have been 
applicable under those principles.  The escapes allow a court to avoid 
such a result and to select another “substantially more appropriate” law 
under the principles of ORS 31.878. 
Other codifications provide similar escapes.292  Indeed, despite 
contrary perceptions, a decision to codify the law does not entail 
outlawing judicial discretion.293  With some notable exceptions, most 
modern legislatures seem to have become aware of the inherent 
limitations in their ability to anticipate everything,294 and they have 
learned to entrust judges with greater discretion than in the past.  
There seems to be an increasing realization that any preformulated 
rule, no matter how carefully or wisely drafted, may, “because of its 
generality”295 or because of its specificity, produce results that are 
contrary to the purpose for which the rule was designed. In the words 
of Peter Hay, this “is a natural consequence of the difference between 
law making and law application.”296  Contemporary rule makers 
attempt to avert such undesirable results by expressly granting judges 
the authority to adjust or avoid altogether the application of the rule 
when the peculiarities of the individual case so dictate.  This grant of 
authority takes the form of escape clauses attached to the rules.297  
 
292 See SYMEONIDES, PROGRESS OR REGRESS?, supra note 226, at 26–30; Symeonides, 
Reciprocal Lessons, supra note 182, at 1773–82. 
293 As early as 1804, the redactors of the Code Napoléon recognized the simple truth that 
had escaped the drafters of the Prussian Code of 1794: that for the legislateur “to anticipate 
everything is a goal impossible of attainment.”  Portalis, Tronchet, Bigot-Préameneu & 
Maleville, Texte du Discours Préliminaire, in 1 J. LOCRÉ, LA LÉGISLATION CIVILE, 
COMMERCIALE ET CRIMINELLE DE LA FRANCE 251, 255 (1827).  Consequently, the 
legislator’s role is “to set, by taking a broad approach, the general propositions of the law, 
[and] to establish principles which will be fertile in application. . . . It is for the judge and the 
jurist, imbued with the general spirit of the laws to direct their application.”  Id. 
294 See id. 
295 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 282. 
296 Peter Hay, Flexibility Versus Predictability and Uniformity in Choice of Law: 
Reflections on Current European and United States Conflicts Law, 226 RECUEIL DES COURS 
281, 291 (1991). 
297 From the rich literature on the subject, see CEZAR DUBLER, LES CLAUSES D’EXCEPTION 
EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ (1983); DEMETRA KOKKINI-IATRIDOU, LES CLAUSES 
D’EXCEPTION EN MATIÈRE DE CONFLITS DE LOIS ET DE CONFLITS DE JURIDICTIONS—OU LE 
PRINCIPE DE PROXIMITÉ (D. Kokkini-Iatridou ed., 1994); SYMEONIDES, PROGRESS OR 
REGRESS?, supra note 226, at 31–34; Peter Hay & Robert B. Ellis, Bridging the Gap Between 
Rules and Approaches in Tort Choice of Law in the United States: A Survey of Current Case 
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The escapes discussed above are an example of such a grant of 
authority.  Their presence will ensure that judges applying the Act 
will be able to consider all the peculiarities of the particular case and 
apply the “most appropriate” law under the circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
The process of drafting the Oregon Act took considerable and 
respectful account of the experience of other countries in drafting their 
own codifications.298  Even so, the Act is based primarily on the 
American experience since the choice-of-law revolution.  As the 
discussion in this Article has demonstrated, most of the Act’s rules—
especially those of ORS 31.875, which is the heart of the whole Act—
have been derived directly from judicial precedents and trends in the rest 
of the United States.  In this sense, the Oregon Act can be seen as a true 
restatement or codification of the American experience. 
To some critics, restating or codifying the case law is not necessarily 
a good thing.  After all, “‘what courts [are] really doing’ might not 
always be an appropriate solution,”299 and our task is to improve on 
those solutions rather than merely reproduce them.  For what it is worth, 
this author’s view is that law reports contain a great deal of wisdom.  
Although academics and legislators have an equal claim on wisdom, the 
courts have a unique advantage.  In trying actual disputes—and doing so 
with the high frequency that American courts try conflicts cases300—
courts are in a position to put to the test not only their own ideas and 
assumptions, but also those of academics and legislators.  The patterns 
and solutions that emerge from these tests reflect the ideas that survived 
this grindstone of reality and, for this reason, they carry a strong 
presumption of correctness.301  One who drafts rules for legislative 
enactment owes respect to these solutions. 
 
Law, 27 INT’L LAW. 369 (1993); Franco Mosconi, Exceptions to the Operation of Choice of 
Law Rules, 217 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 189–95 (1989); Alfred E. von Overbeck, Les 
Questions Générales du Droit International Privé à la Lumière des Codifications et Projets 
Récents, 176 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 186–207 (1982); Symeon C. Symeonides, Exception 
Clauses in American Conflicts Law, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 813 (Supp. 1994). 
298 See discussion supra note 50. 
299 SCOLES, HAY, BORCHERS & SYMEONIDES, supra note 6, at 106. 
300 For example, in 2008, American state and federal courts rendered nearly four thousand 
reported decisions involving conflicts issues.  See Symeonides, 2008 Survey, supra note 162, 
at 271. 
301 Another author has expressed this better.  See Louise Weinberg, Theory Wars in the 
Conflict of Laws, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1631, 1648 (2005) (reviewing SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, 
THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION IN THE COURTS: TODAY AND TOMORROW 
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At the same time, one must recognize that certain risks are inherent in 
compressing judicially crafted solutions into statutory rules.  One such 
risk is that what has been a good solution in past cases may not always 
be a good solution for future cases.  One way to minimize this risk is by 
not over-legislating.  The Oregon Act has avoided this risk both by 
providing specific rules only for cases that have been resolved by the 
case law fairly uniformly and without controversy and by relegating the 
remaining cases or issues to the flexible approach of ORS 31.878, which 
merely lays down parameters for judicial decision rather than 
prescriptions of specific results.  A second way is to provide courts with 
the authority and tools to adjust the specific rules to the exigencies of 
exceptional or unanticipated cases.  The Oregon Act has done this as 
well by employing the escape clauses discussed above. 
Thus, the Oregon Act remains true to the lessons of the American 
choice-of-law revolution.  The Act codifies the results produced by the 
courts that have joined the revolution, and it thus provides a certain 
degree of certainty and efficiency so that prospective litigants will have 
a better idea of their rights and obligations, and courts will not be forced 
to reinvent the wheel in each case.  At the same time, the Act also 
provides courts with a sufficient degree of flexibility so as to resolve 
individual cases fairly and to help develop the law of the future. 
 
(2005)) (“Symeonides acts on the principle that what courts do, and their measure of 
agreement in what they do, are phenomena to be taken very seriously indeed. . . . Symeonides 
has the strong conviction that to glean truth from reality one has to handle a great deal of 
reality, and to do so with utmost care.”). 
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APPENDIX 
75TH OREGON LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY—2009 REGULAR SESSION 
AN ACT 
ON CHOICE-OF-LAW FOR TORTS AND OTHER 
NONCONTRACTUAL CLAIMS 
 
Be It Enacted by the People of the State of Oregon: 
 
DEFINITIONS 
OR. REV. STAT. § 31.850 
DEFINITIONS. For the purposes of ORS 31.850 to 31.890: 
(1) “Conduct” means an act or omission that has occurred or that 
may occur in the future. 
(2) “Domicile” means the place identified under ORS 31.865. 
(3) “Injury” means physical or nonphysical harm to a person or 
property caused by the conduct of another person. 
(4) “Law,” when used in reference to the law of another state, does 
not include that state’s choice-of-law rules. 
(5) “Noncontractual claim” means a claim, other than a claim for 
failure to perform a contractual or other consensual obligation, that 
arises from a tort as defined in ORS 30.260, or any conduct that 
caused or may cause injury compensable by damages, without regard 
to whether damages are sought. 
(6) “Person” means a person as defined in ORS 174.100 and a 
public body. 
(7) “Public body” means a public body as defined in ORS 
174.109, the Oregon Health and Science University, and the Oregon 
State Bar. 
(8) “State” means, unless the context requires otherwise, the 
United States, any state, territory, possession or other jurisdiction of 
the United States, any Indian tribe or other Native American, 
Hawaiian or Alaskan group recognized by federal law or formally 
acknowledged by a state of the United States, and any foreign country 
or territorial subdivision of such country that has its own system of 
laws. [2009 c.451 §1] 
 2009] Oregon’s New Choice-of-Law Codification for Tort Conflicts 1047 
APPLICABILITY 
 
OR. REV. STAT. § 31.855 
APPLICABILITY. ORS 31.850 to 31.890 govern the choice of law 
applicable to noncontractual claims when a choice between or among 
the laws of more than one state is at issue. ORS 31.850 to 31.890 do 
not supersede the provisions of other Oregon statutes that expressly 
designate the law governing a particular noncontractual claim. [2009 
c.451 §2] 
 
PRELIMINARY ISSUES 
 
OR. REV. STAT. § 31.860 
CHARACTERIZATION. (1) Oregon law determines the scope and 
meaning of terms used in ORS 31.850 to 31.890, including whether a 
claim is a noncontractual claim. 
(2) The law of the state determined to be applicable under ORS 
31.850 to 31.890 determines the scope and meaning of terms used in 
that law. [2009 c.451 §3] 
 
OR. REV. STAT. § 31.862 
LOCALIZATION AND OTHER FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS. For the 
purposes of ORS 31.850 to 31.890, the following issues are 
determined under Oregon law: 
(1) What conduct caused the injury, and where the conduct 
occurred. If injurious conduct occurs in more than one state, the state 
where the conduct occurred that is primarily responsible for the injury 
is the state where the injurious conduct occurred. 
(2) Who caused the injury. If a person is liable for the conduct of 
another person, both persons are considered to have caused the injury. 
(3) Where the injury occurred. If the same conduct causes injury 
in more than one state, the place of injury is in the state in which most 
of the injurious effects occurred or may occur. If different persons 
suffer injury in different states by reason of the same conduct, the 
place of injury is determined separately for each person. If a person 
suffers loss by reason of injury or death of another person, the place 
of injury is determined based on the injury to the other person. 
(4) Who suffered the injury. If a claim is made for loss caused by 
injury or death of another person, both the claimant and the other 
person are considered to be injured persons. [2009 c.451 §4] 
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OR. REV. STAT. § 31.865 
DETERMINING DOMICILE. For the purposes of ORS 31.850 to 
31.890: 
(1)(a) The domicile of a natural person is in the state in which 
the person resides with the intent to make it the person’s home for an 
indefinite period of time. 
 (b) A domicile once established continues until it is 
superseded by the acquisition of a new domicile. If a person’s intent 
to change domicile is legally ineffective, the previously established 
domicile continues to be the person’s domicile. 
 (c) If a person’s intent to have a domicile in a given state 
would be legally effective but cannot be ascertained, the state in 
which the person resides is the person’s domicile, and if the person 
resides in more than one state, the residence state that has the most 
pertinent connection to the disputed issue is deemed to be the 
domicile with regard to that issue. 
(2) The domicile of a person other than a natural person is located 
in the state in which the person maintains its principal place of 
business. If the dispute arises from activities directed from another 
state in which the person maintains a place of business other than the 
principal place of business, either state may be considered as the 
domicile at the choice of the other party. 
(3) The domicile of a person is determined as of the date of the 
injury for which the noncontractual claim is made. [2009 c.451 §5] 
 
CLAIMS GOVERNED BY OREGON LAW 
 
OR. REV. STAT. § 31.870 
CLAIMS GOVERNED BY OREGON LAW. Notwithstanding ORS 31.875, 
31.878 and 31.885, Oregon law governs noncontractual claims in the 
following actions: 
(1) Actions in which, after the events giving rise to the dispute, the 
parties agree to the application of Oregon law. 
(2) Actions in which none of the parties raises the issue of 
applicability of foreign law. 
(3) Actions in which the party or parties who rely on foreign law 
fail to assist the court in establishing the relevant provisions of 
foreign law after being requested by the court to do so. 
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(4) Actions filed against a public body of the State of Oregon, 
unless the application of Oregon law is waived by a person authorized 
by Oregon law to make the waiver on behalf of the public body. 
(5) Actions against an owner, lessor or possessor of land, 
buildings or other real property situated in Oregon that seek to 
recover for, or to prevent, injury on that property and arising out of 
conduct that occurs in Oregon. 
(6) Actions between an employer and an employee who is 
primarily employed in Oregon that arise out of an injury that occurs in 
Oregon. 
(7) Actions for professional malpractice arising from services 
rendered entirely in Oregon by personnel licensed to perform those 
services under Oregon law. [2009 c.451 §6] 
 
OR. REV. STAT. § 31.872 
PRODUCT LIABILITY CIVIL ACTIONS. (1) Notwithstanding ORS 
31.875 and 31.878, Oregon law applies to product liability civil 
actions, as defined in ORS 30.900, if: 
 (a) The injured person was domiciled in Oregon and the 
injury occurred in Oregon; or 
 (b) The injured person was domiciled in Oregon or the injury 
occurred in Oregon, and the product: 
  (A) Was manufactured or produced in Oregon; or 
  (B) Was delivered when new for use or consumption in 
Oregon. 
(2) Subsection (1) of this section does not apply to a product 
liability civil action if a defendant demonstrates that the use in 
Oregon of the product that caused the injury could not have been 
foreseen and that none of the defendant’s products of the same type 
were available in Oregon in the ordinary course of trade at the time of 
the injury. 
(3) If a party demonstrates that the application of the law of a state 
other than Oregon to a disputed issue is substantially more 
appropriate under the principles of ORS 31.878, that issue shall be 
governed by the law of the other state. 
(4) All noncontractual claims or issues in product liability civil 
actions not provided for or not disposed of under this section are 
governed by the law of the state determined under ORS 31.878. [2009 
c.451 §7] 
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CHOICE OF LAW 
 
OR. REV. STAT. § 31.875 
GENERAL RULES. (1) Noncontractual claims between an injured 
person and the person whose conduct caused the injury are governed 
by the law of the state designated in this section. 
(2)(a) If the injured person and the person whose conduct caused 
the injury were domiciled in the same state, the law of that state 
governs. However, the law of the state in which the injurious conduct 
occurred determines the standard of care by which the conduct is 
judged. If the injury occurred in a state other than the one in which 
the conduct occurred, the provisions of subsection (3)(c) of this 
section apply. 
 (b) For the purposes of this section, persons domiciled in 
different states shall be treated as if domiciled in the same state to the 
extent that laws of those states on the disputed issues would produce 
the same outcome. 
(3) If the injured person and the person whose conduct caused the 
injury were domiciled in different states and the laws of those states 
on the disputed issues would produce a different outcome, the law of 
the state designated in this subsection governs. 
 (a) If both the injurious conduct and the resulting injury 
occurred in the same state, the law of that state governs if either the 
injured person or the person whose conduct caused the injury was 
domiciled in that state. 
 (b) If both the injurious conduct and the resulting injury 
occurred in a state other than the state in which either the injured 
person or the person whose conduct caused the injury were domiciled, 
the law of the state of conduct and injury governs. If a party 
demonstrates that, under the circumstances of the particular case, the 
application of that law to a disputed issue will not serve the objectives 
of that law, that issue will be governed by the law selected under ORS 
31.878. 
 (c) If the injurious conduct occurred in one state and the 
resulting injury in another state, the law of the state of conduct 
governs. However, the law of the state of injury governs if: 
  (A) The activities of the person whose conduct caused the 
injury were such as to make foreseeable the occurrence of injury in 
that state; and 
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  (B) The injured person formally requests the application 
of that state’s law by a pleading or amended pleading. The request 
shall be deemed to encompass all claims and issues against that 
defendant. 
(4) If a party demonstrates that application to a disputed issue of 
the law of a state other than the state designated by subsection (2) or 
(3) of this section is substantially more appropriate under the 
principles of ORS 31.878, that issue is governed by the law of the 
other state. [2009 c.451 §8] 
 
OR. REV. STAT. § 31.878 
GENERAL AND RESIDUAL APPROACH. Except as provided in ORS 
31.870, 31.872, 31.875 and 31.885, the rights and liabilities of the 
parties with regard to disputed issues in a noncontractual claim are 
governed by the law of the state whose contacts with the parties and 
the dispute and whose policies on the disputed issues make 
application of the state’s law the most appropriate for those issues. 
The most appropriate law is determined by: 
(1) Identifying the states that have a relevant contact with the 
dispute, such as the place of the injurious conduct, the place of the 
resulting injury, the domicile, habitual residence or pertinent place of 
business of each person, or the place in which the relationship 
between the parties was centered; 
(2) Identifying the policies embodied in the laws of these states on 
the disputed issues; and 
(3) Evaluating the relative strength and pertinence of these 
policies with due regard to: 
 (a) The policies of encouraging responsible conduct, deterring 
injurious conduct and providing adequate remedies for the conduct; 
and 
 (b) The needs and policies of the interstate and international 
systems, including the policy of minimizing adverse effects on 
strongly held policies of other states. [2009 c.451 §9] 
  
OR. REV. STAT. § 31.880 
JOINT TORTFEASORS AND THIRD PARTIES. Notwithstanding ORS 
31.870, 31.872 and 31.875, if two or more persons are liable for the 
same claim, the rights and liabilities between those persons are 
governed by the law determined for the particular issue under ORS 
31.878. If a third party pays compensation to a person injured by the 
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conduct of another person, the right of the third party to recoup the 
amount paid is governed by the law determined for the particular 
issue under ORS 31.878. [2009 c.451 §10] 
 
OR. REV. STAT. § 31.885 
AGREEMENTS ON APPLICABLE FOREIGN LAW. Notwithstanding ORS 
31.875, 31.878 and 31.880, but subject to ORS 81.100 to 81.135, an 
agreement providing that an issue or issues falling within the scope of 
ORS 31.850 to 31.890 will be governed by the law of a state other 
than Oregon is enforceable in Oregon if the agreement was entered 
into after the parties had knowledge of the events giving rise to the 
dispute. [2009 c.451 §11] 
 
OR. REV. STAT. § 31.890 
COMMENTARY. The Oregon Law Commission shall make available 
on the website maintained by the commission a copy of the 
commentary approved by the commission for the provisions of ORS 
31.850 to 31.890. [2009 c.451 §12] 
 
